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This dissertation examines patterns of public opinion change and their determinants from 
the perspectives of both internal and external theories of opinion change. Based on new and 
original panel data on Norwegian citizens’ opinions on a range of policy issues from 2009 to 
2017, this study contributes four main insights, summarized in the concept of ‘the consistent 
citizen’. 
 
First, the dissertation reveals a comparatively low level of opinion change both when opinion 
change is studied both in the short run and the long run, and across an exhaustive range of 
political issues. Thus, I argue that people change their political opinions to a moderate 
extent, thereby challenging long-standing scholarly beliefs about the widespread volatility of 
mass public opinion. 
 
Second, the dissertation demonstrates that opinion change is somewhat influenced by (a) 
party cues, although the effects differ depending on the party’s role in the policy process 
and the saliency of the issue; (b) political awareness; and (c) issue importance. That said, all 
these conventional expectations prove more modest than what much of the previous 
literature has argued. Moreover, in terms of effect size, the biggest effect on opinion change 
is assigned to (d) external shocks, while (e) the political salience of the policy issue at hand is 
found to have more moderate effects on opinion volatility. Therefore, I argue that when 
opinion change takes place, it happens in predictable ways given the context of the policy 
issue at hand and individual preconditions.  
 
Third, another main finding is that sudden extensive changes in public opinion due to 
external events do not necessarily cause a permanent shift in preferences. I identify an 
attitudinal baseline that citizens move away from in response to a sudden exogenous shock 
and yet revert to after a considerable amount of time has passed. Consequently, I argue that 
the existence of a baseline attitude serves to support the argument that citizens’ attitudes 





Fourth, following citizens’ policy opinions across one gradual process of policy formation and 
one where there is an exogenous shock to the political system, this dissertation suggests 
that understanding the context is important to predicting opinion change. Studying opinion 
developments in real-time settings, I argue that the rhetorical environment that surrounds 
an issue, as well as the political and societal contexts that it operates within, is likely to 
contribute to both the scope and timing of opinion change. 
 
Overall, these findings suggest that on average, citizens are consistent and able to manage 
their role as democratic citizens by holding mainly stable baseline opinions as long as 
nothing happens, yet they are responsive to actual changes in the political environment. This 
sketch of a consistent median citizen challenges much of the existing literature and have 
important implications for how we evaluate citizens’ democratic competence within 
normative democratic theory. 
 
By studying an exhaustive range of policy issues within one polity across an extended period 
of time using different data sources with differing modes of conduct and time between 
waves, this dissertation offers one of the most comprehensive studies of opinion instability 
within a European multi-party polity. As the European literature on opinion instability is 
scattered and inconclusive, adding one more study to the European body of research is a 
contribution in itself. Moreover, by utilizing observational panel data, I can make more 
sound causal conclusions about the patterns of attitude change as they take place in the real 
world and take context more systematically into account. In sum, the empirical and 
methodological approaches undertaken in this thesis provide both substantive knowledge 
and improved causal evidence about the scope of opinion change and its mechanisms within 








List of Articles 
 
Nordø, Åsta Dyrnes. “Opinion Instability in Representative Democracies: Making a case for 
the Politically Consistent Citizen.” Sent to Political Behavior for review August 2, 2019. 
 
Nordø, Åsta Dyrnes. “Do Voters Follow? The Effect of Party Cues on Opinion Change during a 
Policy Process.” Currently under review at Scandinavian Political Studies. 
 
Nordø, Åsta Dyrnes and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten.  «The Scope Effects of the Refugee Crisis on 
Public Opinion towards Immigration.” Sent to European Journal of Political Research for 

































Table of Contents 
Scientific environment ............................................................................................................................. I 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. II 
Summary ................................................................................................................................................ IV 
List of Articles ......................................................................................................................................... VI 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. - 1 - 
1.1 Research questions and contributions ................................................................................ - 1 - 
1.2 Public opinion: A definitorial discussion ............................................................................. - 6 - 
2 Public opinion and democracy .................................................................................................. - 11 - 
2.1 The normative import of opinion change ......................................................................... - 11 - 
2.2 Theories of public opinion change .................................................................................... - 14 - 
2.3 Summary of the theoretical discussion ............................................................................. - 21 - 
3 Studying public opinion change in Norway ............................................................................... - 25 - 
3.1 The political system matters ............................................................................................. - 25 - 
3.2 The case of Norway: A least likely laboratory for studying opinion change? ................... - 28 - 
4 Methodology and data .............................................................................................................. - 37 - 
4.1 Panel data analyses on public opinion change .................................................................. - 37 - 
4.2 Estimating panel models of opinion change ..................................................................... - 40 - 
4.3 Data on the Norwegian public: The Norwegian Citizen Panel and the Norwegian National 
Election Study ................................................................................................................................ - 41 - 
4.4 Challenges of inference: Panel attrition and panel conditioning bias .............................. - 48 - 
5 The structure of the thesis ........................................................................................................ - 57 - 
5.1 Article 1: Opinion Instability in Representative Democracies: Making a Case for the 
Politically Consistent Citizen .......................................................................................................... - 59 - 
5.2 Article 2: Do Voters Follow? The Effect of Party Cues on Opinion Change During a Policy 
Process........................................................................................................................................... - 61 - 
5.3 Article 3: The Scope Effects of the Refugee Crisis on Public Opinion Toward Immigration - 63 
- 
6 Conclusion and future research ................................................................................................ - 67 - 
6.1 The consistent median citizen ........................................................................................... - 67 - 
6.2 Theoretical implications .................................................................................................... - 68 - 
6.3 The way ahead................................................................................................................... - 73 - 
7 Literature list ............................................................................................................................. - 75 - 
8 Article 1: Opinion Instability in Representative Democracies: Making a Case for the Politically 
Consistent Citizen .............................................................................................................................. - 85 - 
9 Article 2: Do Voters Follow? The Effect of Party Cues on Public Opinion During a Process of Policy 
Change ............................................................................................................................................. - 147 - 
10 Article 3: The Scope Effects of the Refugee Crisis on Public Opinion toward Immigration - 189 - 

 




1.1 Research questions and contributions 
Citizens play a leading role in democracy. Through elections, voters elect the politicians that 
they consider to be the most able to represent them, and this is done through evaluating 
parties’ policy positions and comparing them to their own political interests. This idea of an 
‘issue public’ who are well informed and care about policy issues is one of the classical ideas 
of citizens in democratic theory. Yet citizens’ ability to fulfill this role is a topic of enduring 
controversy in the literature on public opinion. What characterizes citizens’ patterns of 
opinion change? Is it marked by a presence of non-attitudes reflected in random opinion 
change, or do citizens hold real attitudes, indicating that patterns of opinion change should 
follow certain regularities? 
 
Growing out of Converse’s authoritative study, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass 
Publics” (1964), the dominant literature argues that citizens show levels of opinion instability 
that make them incapable of playing a supportive role in democracy. Through his ‘black and 
white’ model, Converse argues that public opinions on policies are generated by two groups: 
one small group that has stable attitudes (issue public) and one dominant group that 
changes its attitudes at random. This study has spawned an entire research tradition 
studying public opinion and has also inspired a large body of revisionist literature debating 
the accuracy of its conclusions. One strand of revisionist studies attributes the largest part of 
response lability found by Converse to measurement error (e.g., Achen, 1975; Ansolabehere 
et al., 2008; Erikson, 1979). Another strand of research argues that the diagnosis of mass 
publics is not nonattitudes but ambivalence, identified as ad hoc cognitive assessments of 
survey questions (e.g.,  Feldman, 1989; Hill and Kriesi, 2001; Zaller, 1992). And yet another 
strand of studies focused on the time period Converse based his findings on, arguing that 
this was a particularly non-ideological period in American politics and that citizens’ 
perceptions of policy positions are considerably more accurate when the level of political 
conflict is higher and reflected in the debate surrounding policy alternatives (Key, 1961; Nie 
et al., 1979 [1976]).  
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Recently, the role of citizens in democracy has received renewed attention following the 
publication of Achen and Bartels’ book ‘Democracy for Realists. Why Elections Do Not 
Produce Responsive Government’ (2016). Their main conclusion reads that: “group and 
partisan loyalties, not policy preferences or ideologies, are fundamental in democratic 
politics” (Achen and Bartels, 2016: 18). This dissertation is partly inspired by and should be 
read as a contribution to this ongoing discussion. 
 
Achen and Bartels (2016) argue that the contemporary democratic process does not 
function according to its ideals, both in terms of providing a basis for mass participation and 
in terms of facilitating an efficient representation of the public will. They base this conclusion 
on five empirical observations: 1) most democratic citizens are politically uninterested and 
poorly informed and lack either the resources or motivation to choose their parties or 
candidates based on policy issues; 2) even the issue public of sophisticated and engaged 
citizens base their political decisions on social identities and group and partisan loyalties; 3) 
citizens have a hard time assessing the responsibility of government accurately, leading to 
blind or myopic retrospective voting, thus weakening the accountability function of 
elections; 4) citizens’ perceptions of parties’ policy platforms and their own policy views are 
significantly influenced by their party preferences; and 5) institutions of direct democracy 
are mostly hijacked by interest groups and lobbyists as citizens refrain from getting engaged 
in political matters. 
 
The restated dire diagnosis by Achen and Bartels (2016) of citizens in western representative 
democracies half a century after Converse’s seminal study has sparked a new scholarly 
debate about its accuracy and extensiveness (e.g., Achen and Bartels, 2018; Fowler and Hall, 
2018; Sniderman, 2017). This dissertation speaks to the above debate by asking two 
interrelated research questions: To what extent do citizens change their opinions, and which 
factors successfully predict opinion change? 
 
By examining these questions through the lens of extensive data on the Norwegian citizenry, 
I aspire to contribute to the research on opinion change and its determinants in several 
ways. This thesis’ main contribution is theoretical, as it makes a case for the consistent 
citizen. Going against the tide of much of the dominant theorizing surrounding citizens’ 
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inability to play a meaningful and supportive role in democracy, this dissertation argues that 
in general, people hold real opinions – first and foremost, this applies to their temporal 
consistency, and it also applies in the sense that when people do change their attitudes, they 
do so in non-random ways related to contextual push and pull factors. 
 
The second contribution is empirical, based on this dissertation’s scope of analysis that 
gauge the presence of opinion change across an exhaustive range of policy areas. Instead of 
studying mass opinion change in a particular domain on a specific topic like much of the 
existing literature (Druckman and Leeper, 2012), this dissertation offers a more holistic 
approach by incorporating a wide range of policy issues with varying degrees of issue 
salience and proximity to ideological core issues. Due to this broad approach, the 
conclusions drawn in this dissertation offer a general outlook on public opinion change 
within a polity. 
 
Third, I make another empirical contribution by expanding the US-dominant empirical focus 
to include a comprehensive study of opinion change and its determinants within a very 
different context – that of the Norwegian multi-party system. European studies of opinion 
change are scattered and often based on less-than-ideal data. Consequently, this study of 
Norwegian citizens, based on representative panel data, provides long-awaited knowledge 
of mechanisms of opinion change in a context that differs substantially from the US. By 
adding a comprehensive study to the body of literature on opinion change, and conferring 
the findings of the literature on European public opinion, the dissertation is well-suited to 
contribute to theory development by demonstrating the limited applicability and validity of 
the current dominant theory in the Norwegian case. Thus, this thesis aspires to use insights 
from the multi-party context of Norway to inform theories of opinion change and their 
application to Western European multi-party states. 
 
Finally, I make a methodological contribution by studying opinion change as it evolves within 
a real-world setting. Previous research on mechanisms of opinion change relies mostly on 
cross-sectional studies, failing to soundly research the causal expectations laid out in the 
literature, or on experimental designs, failing to reconstruct the real-world environment 
within which citizens’ attitudes are shaped. This thesis improves on the previous research by 
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accommodating representative panel data with research designs that are apt for studying 
opinion change at the individual level, thereby securing improved levels of internal validity. 
Specifically, I conduct two case studies of one slow-moving and one abrupt political event 
and their effects on public support for related policies by monitoring public opinion over an 
extended period of time. Taken together, the empirical approaches undertaken in this thesis 
provide both improved causal evidence and new substantive knowledge with respect to 
attitude change and its dynamics within a multi-party context. 
 
The overall research questions are examined through three empirical articles with differing 
levels of analysis answering different aspects of the research agenda. The first article takes a 
broad approach by researching levels of opinion change on an exhaustive number of policy 
issues and studying the moderating effects of political awareness and issue importance, 
which are the main explanatory variables in the existing literature. In contrast to many 
studies arguing that a lack of opinion stability is a trait of citizens in modern western 
democracies, this study suggests that large segments of the public do hold stable opinions 
and that political awareness and issue importance moderate opinion change but only to a 
limited degree.  
 
In the second article, I study the role of party cues on opinion change following a 
controversial policy proposal to criminalize street begging as it is introduced, debated, and 
decided upon. There is a presumption in the literature that citizens comply with their 
preferred party’s policy opinion as they become aware of it. This in-depth study moderates 
the existing expectation presented in the literature by showing that party cues affect only 
parts of the electorate and only as the policy reform becomes salient in the public debate. 
Thus, this dissertation indicates that party cues affect voters differently and that the role 
that party cues play is likely to be affected by the broader information environment 
surrounding the policy change. 
 
Finally, the third article investigates public opinion reactions to sudden exogenous shocks by 
taking the refugee crisis of 2015 as the empirical point of departure. Importantly, I find that 
the public reaction was big in terms of scope, with more exclusionary attitudes reported not 
only toward refugee policies but across more general immigration issues. Moreover, the 
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exclusionary reaction was observed across political stripes but was driven by the supporters 
of parties who agreed to restrict immigration in response to the crisis. Last, the reaction was 
enduring, but it reverted to pre-crisis levels of support close to two years after the 
authorities gained control of the situation. 
 
Overall, this dissertation shows that members of the public hold real political opinions – 
characterized by opinion consistency, interconnectedness of related attitudes, and united 
and lasting (but not permanent) change in opinions – when faced with contextual change. 
These findings counter the elitist perspective recited by Converse (1964) and Achen and 
Bartels (2016) regarding low public capacities for politics based on the unreliable and 
unstable nature of mass opinion. Moreover, this dissertation’s studies show that when 
citizens change their opinions, it is only moderately explained by the factors that dominate 
in the literature: political sophistication, issue importance, and party attachment. Lastly, the 
three empirical articles indicate the importance of context – meaning both the specific policy 
context and the broader political context – in properly comprehending mass opinion change. 
Specifically, I ascribe elements of the deviation from the findings in the dominant US 
literature to the political context in which this study is conducted. In sum, the findings in this 
dissertation adds important knowledge to the ongoing debate over democratic citizenship 
and have implications for how scholars should view the role of public opinion in a 
representative democracy. 
 
The rest of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. I continue this section with 
presenting the overall analytical framework of the dissertation and connect the main 
theoretical concepts: public opinion and opinion change. Second, I turn to what the extant 
research has to say about the overall research question, discussing a number of authoritative 
studies in the literature and presenting an outline of the theoretical expectations in each of 
my three studies. Third, I present the Norwegian case and through a focus on the party 
system, the social system, and the media system I suggest that the Norwegian context might 
create an environment where it is easier to hold stable attitudes. Fourth, I elaborate on the 
methodological choices made throughout the thesis, with a particular focus on panel data, 
the data sources used, and the measurement of opinions through surveys. Fifth, I present a 
summary of the empirical articles with a focus on the main findings and contributions of 
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each. In the final section, I tie the different findings together to reach an overall conclusion, 
highlight the theoretical implications and point toward avenues for future research.  
 
1.2 Public opinion: A definitorial discussion 
 
 Defining the construct: Attitudes, opinions and public opinion.  
Different definitions of attitudes have been proposed as the scholarly interest in citizens’ 
opinions has developed. The first definitions were broad in their outreach and closely tied to 
behavior. Consider, for example, Allport’s (1935: 784) classical account: “An attitude is a 
mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or 
dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is 
related.” As the discipline became preoccupied with measurement, new and narrower 
definitions focusing on evaluative predispositions toward single objects were proposed (for 
an overview, see Krosnick et al., 2005: 22-24). Arguably, the most widely accepted definition 
today was proposed by Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 1), who define an attitude as “A 
psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree 
of favor or disfavor.” Two key features of this definition should be mentioned. First, an 
attitude is directed toward a specific attitude object. This object can be a person, an idea, a 
place, a policy, an experience, etc. Second, an attitude is evaluative, reflecting a feeling of 
positivity or negativity toward the attitude object (Holbrook, 2011: 141-142).  
 
With this walk down the ladder of abstraction from concept to measure followed the 
recognition that manifestations of attitudes (as assessed through surveys) are not the same 
as the attitudes themselves.  Indeed, measurement is imperfect, consisting of both random 
and systematic errors. Consequently, the term ‘opinion’ was introduced as the designation 
of respondents’ latent attitudes as measured through surveys. Many scholars, especially 
within psychology, make strict distinctions between the concepts of attitude and opinion. 
While acknowledging this difference, I lean on the political science tradition using these two 
concepts interchangeably (Clawson and Oxley, 2008: 16). Arguably, this also better reflects 
the common usage of the words. 
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One last construct needs to be defined, which is that of public opinion. It is a key term in 
democratic theory as it denominates the relationship between the people and the 
government. Over time, people have ascribed a variety of meanings to this term, but since 
the emergence of extended male suffrage in the nineteenth century, public opinion has 
commonly been used as a synonym for mass political attitudes (Zaller and Feldman, 1992). In 
more recent history, the debate between the socio-psychological and the sociological 
conceptions of public opinion has preoccupied the field.1 Representing the former group, 
Allport (1937) was among the first to conceptualize public opinion as an aggregation of 
individual opinions. This view was contested by sociologist Blumer (1948), who saw public 
opinion as an inherently collective phenomenon, emerging through the communication and 
clash of group interests. In a similar critique of the sidelining of public opinion with an 
aggregate of individuals, Bourdieu (1979) declared in the article title that “Public opinion 
does not exist”. In his view, the prevailing classification of public opinion is blind to power 
relations and group interests when assuming that all opinions are equal and thus should be 
equally weighed. Accordingly, public opinion could never be properly evaluated through 
individual survey responses.  
 
Despite these objections, with the establishment of the polling industry, the understanding 
of public opinion as an aggregate of individuals’ opinions prevailed, and today, public 
opinion literature has come to see public opinion and opinion polls as two sides of the same 
coin (Converse, 1987). Modern critics are more preoccupied with limitations of 
measurement, contending that public opinion exists, but that polls do not do a very good job 
of capturing it (e.g., Bishop, 2005). Most public opinion scholars today share a confidence in 
the aggregation-oriented approach, not least due to advances within survey research. Page 
and Shapiro (1992: 30-31) nicely sum up this belief:  
 
We see survey research as a remarkably effective research tool, particularly in recent 
years when practitioners have been able to take advantage of long experience. 
Carefully worked out sampling schemes permit confident inferences about the 
opinions of millions of Americans, based on interviews with a few hundreds of them. 
                                                          
1 For a thorough review of different understandings of public opinion, see Noelle-Neumann (1993) and Herbst 
(1993). 
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Modern instrument design and interviewing techniques, combining art and science, 
elicit meaningful responses. (…) And our focus on changes over time in responses to 
identical questions overcomes most of the usual travails associated with imperfect 
question wording. 
 
While recognizing the limitations in the definition of public opinion as aggregation, this 
understanding of public opinion forms the basis of my use of the concept. 
 
 Studying opinion change 
This thesis asks whether citizens hold consistent opinions or not. In the literature on public 
opinion, the designation of consistency has been used to describe different aspects of 
citizens’ opinion formation. Consistency has been used to describe attitude constraints, 
meaning the likelihood of a citizen’s taking on a certain position on one issue given their 
position on another. Consistency has also been used as synonym for opinion stability, 
meaning the predictability of a citizen’s position on an issue at one point in time given their 
position on the same issue at an earlier point in time. Finally, consistency has been used to 
describe attitude congruence, construed as the extent to which a citizen’s policy opinions on 
specific issues are shaped by their general political orientation (Sniderman and Bullock 2004, 
p.337). In this dissertation, opinion stability and instability is in focus. Thus, when I discuss 
consistent citizens in this dissertation, it should be taken to designate citizens with stable 
opinions. 
 
To evaluate the presence of consistent citizens a focus on volatility in opinions is necessary 
and thus this study is preoccupied with opinion change and not opinions per se. The process 
of people changing their underlying opinions has been described as projection, persuasion 
and rationalization. When using the term opinion change I follow Lenz (2009) who argues 
that this concept has the virtue of not implying any particular mechanism. Inherent in the 
concept of change is a temporal aspect: a shift away from previous opinions and toward new 
ones. Attitude change includes processes of attitude formation (a change from having no 
attitude toward an attitude object to having an attitude) and changes in an existing attitude 
(an existing attitude becoming more or less positive or even a jump from the positive to the 
negative side or vice versa) (Holbrook, 2011: 142). Although scholars of psychology treat the 
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former as a special type of attitude change (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993), I do not distinguish 
between the two in the empirical analyses that make up this dissertation. 
 
Two different analytical approaches to the study of opinion change have developed, and 
these two approaches also tend to come to different conclusions regarding citizens’ 
democratic competence. Studies of micro public opinion hold the individual as the unit of 
analysis and typically employ surveys that measure an individual’s support for an issue. 
Studies of macro public opinion hold a given political issue or a given point in time as the 
unit of analysis, typically focusing on the overall percentage of individuals who support or 
oppose a perspective at a given point in time (Druckman and Leeper, 2012). Despite being 
based on the same study subjects – survey respondents – their conclusions differ radically. 
Whereas studies of aggregated opinions report high degrees of opinion stability (Page and 
Shapiro, 1992; Ansolabehere et al., 2008; Erikson et al., 2002; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010), 
studies of individual-level opinion change find evidence of unstable political attitudes (e.g., 
Achen and Bartels, 2016; Chong and Druckman, 2010; Zaller, 1992; Freeder et al., 2019).  
  
This dissertation studies individual-level opinion change as opposed to aggregate public 
opinion change. As I am interested in informing the debate on whether citizens are able to 
contribute fruitfully to the upholding of democracy, studying change at the individual level 
seems the most sound. Some scholars of macro studies argue that as long as public opinion 
gives stable and meaningful feedback to government it does not matter if there are currents 
of individual-level volatility behind the aggregate stability – democracy would still be in good 
shape (e.g., Page and Shapiro, 1992; Erikson et al., 2002) Yet based on democratic theory, 
such an argument is misguided at best. If considerable proportions of citizens are 
characterized by random fluctuations in attitudes, the aggregate, no matter how stable, 
creates an illusionary rule by the people. In Achen’s (1975: 1227) assessment, if individuals 
do not possess meaningful attitudes, let alone well-defined policy preferences, then 
“democracy loses its starting point.” Thus, it is only through studying opinion change at the 
individual level that we can gain systematic insights into the cornerstone of democratic 
theory, namely citizens’ competence in directing democratic politics. 
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2 Public opinion and democracy 
 
2.1 The normative import of opinion change 
Implicit in any theory of democracy is a model of the citizen: their cognitive capacities, 
behavioral tendencies, and motivations. Yet the theories vary considerably in their views on 
the capabilities of citizens to support democratic institutions through their interests and 
actions. In this section, I focus on two theoretical directions that offer radically divergent 
views on citizen capacity – the ‘classical’ theory of democracy and the elitist theory of 
democracy.2  
 
In the classical model of democracy, citizens play a vital role, characterized by their active 
participation, high levels of attention to, and interest in politics, and their ability to decide 
matters in favor of the general interest. Based on this belief in the public’s capacities, Mill 
(2006 [1861]) advocated for a representative democracy to secure individual liberty and the 
development of individuality. He argued that participation in political life was vital to 
creating a direct interest in government and, as such, a basis for an informed and engaged 
citizenry (Held, 1987: 85-102). As such, the classical model of democracy argued for the 
superiority of democratic institutions based on the possibilities it offered for the human 
development of its citizenry (Walker, 1966: 288). In contemporary democratic theory, Dahl 
(1961; 1989) has built heavily on Mill in his theory of pluralist democracy. The main assertion 
for classical democracy theorists is that of popular rule — the idea that public policy results 
from extensive and informed discussions among an active, informed and democratically 
minded citizenry. Put slightly different by Dahl (1956: 3), “Democratic theory is concerned 
with processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over 
leaders.”  
 
The elitist theory of democracy – first introduced by Madison in The Federalist Papers 
(Hamilton et al., 1961) yet developed into a theory by Weber (1978 [1922]) and later by 
Schumpeter (1942) – has a radically different view on the democratic capabilities of ordinary 
                                                          
2 The main aim of this discussion of democratic theory is to show the different views of citizens’ capacities 
within two main theoretical directions. In between the two strands of thought discussed here are a dozen 
variations. For a more thorough discussion of different directions within democratic theory and their idea of 
the citizenry’s capacities, see Held (1987).  
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citizens. This group of scholars considers the electorate to consist of two groups: 1) the elite, 
who possesses ideological commitments as well as manipulative expertise, and 2) the 
masses, who are poorly informed, have little interest in public affairs, and are largely driven 
by emotions and thus subject to manipulation. Furthermore, instead of justifying the 
superiority of democracy in terms of its possibilities of human development like Mill and 
Dahl, scholars of elitist democracy theory focus on democratic institutions’ superiority in 
terms of efficient and coherent government. Based on this understanding of democracy they 
criticize the classical theory of democracy for being utopian and naïve, ignoring the dangers 
of democratic instability due to demagogic leadership, mass psychology, and group coercion 
connected to large-scale participation by a democratically inadequate citizenry (Walker, 
1966: 286-289). As a consequence of citizens’ inadequacies elitist scholars argue that 
democratic stability is best secured when democratic decision-making is limited to choosing 
between competing elites in elections (Walker, 1966). Thus, the two theories of democracy 
offer radically different understandings of citizens’ role in a democracy. In the classical 
theory of democracy competent and interested citizens guard the system against tyranny 
and improves quality of government, whereas in the elitist account of democracy the 
citizenry is considered a potential threat to the system which must be curbed for democracy 
to ensure coherent government. 
 
Confronting the different models of democracy with empirical evidence, the bleak picture of 
citizen competence painted by the first generation of public opinion scholars has received 
much attention and was also cited in support of the elitist account of democracy theory 
(Jenkins-Smith and Herron, 2005). The first proposition coming from these studies was that 
most citizens lack the cognitive capacity to understand the complexity of politics and they 
lack sufficient political knowledge to develop reasoned attitudes toward policy issues. 
Second, they argue that most citizens lack the underlying dispositions necessary to 
systematically structure and constrain their views on different policy domains. Third, they 
contend that individual-level opinions are unstable, subject to rapid swings, and susceptible 
to overreactions that are detrimental to coherent, sustained policy (Converse, 1964; 
Converse, 1970; Lippmann, 1925; Almond, 1956; Campbell et al., 1960). Taken together, the 
first comprehensive studies of public opinion identified a public incapable of providing 
meaningful guidance to government decision makers on policy matters. 
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This intimate connection between an uninformed citizenry and opinion change has made 
opinion instability a key concern since the lack of opinions on most political matters, in its 
logical conclusion, may undermine the legitimacy of modern democracies. If sufficient 
numbers of citizens are indifferent to even the most salient issues, it becomes difficult to 
maintain the representative idea of democracy that government policies are adopted based 
on the public will. And if public policy is not justified by popular support, the legitimizing link 
between the masses and the ruling elite is gone. 
 
Thus, when connecting normative democratic theory to public opinion studies, stable 
opinions seem to be considered both preferable and necessary to secure sound democratic 
systems. Yet, as Togeby (2004: 230-231) highlights, holding stable opinions is not a sign of 
competent and well-qualified citizens in and of itself. If citizens’ surroundings change in 
some way – be they political, like a change in government, or personal, like losing their job 
or having a sick child – it is reasonable to expect that their attitudes in connection to these 
issues may change. To put it differently, if reality changes, but attitudes remain stable, this 
should be seen as an expression of rigid and unreflected attitudes, and not of competence.  
Druckman (2012) and Druckman and Leeper (2012) provide content to this argument, 
holding that:  
 
“Strong opinions and stability are often seen as signs of an engaged and thoughtful 
citizenry – coveted attributes. (…) Yet strong attitudes also lead to motivated 
reasoning that can cause individuals to resist consideration of relevant alternative 
perspectives. At the extreme, such individuals can be close-mindedly dogmatic, which 
might be as problematic as extremely labile preferences. In terms of opinion ‘quality,’ 
theorists should not presume that the quality of well-developed and thought-out 
opinions always trumps that of fleeting opinions” (Druckman and Leeper, 2012: 62) 
 
I side with this line of thought and argue that stable opinions should not always be 
considered preferable. In fact, changing attitudes may be just as real and thought through as 
stable attitudes, especially in meeting with a changing reality. 
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2.2 Theories of public opinion change 
 
2.2.1 The original debate: Converse’s nonattitude thesis 
The first theories of public opinion were inspired by the great mismatch between the 
democratically engaged citizen, as identified by classic conceptions of participatory 
democracy, and the disengaged citizen identified by the first generation of empirical studies 
on the mass publics. Philip Converse’s (1964; 1970) dire conclusion about the democratic 
capability of citizens became the now-famous “nonattitude” thesis, stating that large 
swathes of the public do not hold any views on the major issues of the day, but when asked 
for their opinion, they express one anyway (either to pretend they have opinions or to 
satisfy the interviewer) (Saris and Sniderman, 2004: 1).  
 
Furthermore, Converse’s (1964) ‘black and white’ model argued that public opinions on 
policies are made up by two groups: one that had unchanging attitudes (issue publics) and 
another that changes its attitudes at random. He also introduced and discussed an 
imaginable third group of ‘durable changers’3 that have meaningful policy attitudes yet 
change them over time. Still, in conclusion, he found this group to be negligible in size. 
Converse was clear that the model approximates public opinion better for some issues than 
others. Yet, both he and revisionist scholars seem to agree that in general, instability is 
associated with nonattitudes and not with ‘durable changers’ (Erikson, 1979; Hill and Kriesi, 
2001; Converse, 1964). 
 
As already mentioned, Converse’s study triggered extensive scholarly revisionism. Still, all 
these revisionist studies of citizens’ capabilities have failed to fundamentally challenge the 
finding that most people have limited political awareness. Page and Shapiro (1992: 11) sum 
up 40 years of research by stating that no available evidence indicates any increase in the 
public’s level of political knowledge. According to Achen and Bartels (2016: 4), “voters, even 
the most informed voters, typically makes choices not on the basis of policy preferences of 
ideology, but on the basis of who they are – their social identities.” 
 
                                                          
3 This term was first introduced by Hill and Kriesi (2001). 
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Another line of research supporting the contention that citizens’ political preferences are 
haphazard by nature is exemplified in Achen and Bartels’ (2016) work on political responses 
to natural events like shark attacks and droughts. They find that instead of evaluating 
politicians based on their ideological proximity or overall evaluation in office, citizens hold 
incumbent politicians responsible for the natural disasters that took place during their term 
of office. Based on this account, Achen and Bartels argue that voters are irrational and thus 
that the conventional understanding of democratic accountability in modern democracies is 
severely undermined. Yet, despite its central standing in the research environment, few 
studies have looked into and replicated the nonattitude thesis based on the same broad 
scope as Converse’s original study, not even across countries.4 
 
A characteristic of the debate on the extent to which citizens hold volatile opinions is the 
tendency to use a surprisingly narrow data material to draw general conclusions. The 
revisionist literature emerging in the wake of Converse’s nonattitude thesis is almost 
exclusively based not only on US data but even on the same data source: the American 
National Election Study (ANES) (Achen, 1975; Ansolabehere et al., 2008; Converse, 1964; 
Converse, 1970; Converse and Markus, 1979; Erikson, 1979; Feldman, 1989; Freeder et al., 
2019; Achen and Bartels, 2016; Zaller, 1992).5 Inevitably, one runs to the risk that 
specificities in the data connected to the wording of questions and scaling options play an 
unfavorably large role in the general conclusions drawn.   
 
The varying levels of analyses across studies have also contributed to the lack of a common 
understanding of the state of public opinion formation. As mentioned earlier, one strand of 
research has utilized aggregate-level data when studying opinion change, using the change 
in distribution of respondents on an issue to measure the volatility of opinions (Page and 
Shapiro, 1992; Erikson et al., 2002; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). These studies consistently 
report a politically stable and rational citizenry, which is quite the opposite of the studies 
based on individual-level data. In Page and Shapiro’s (1992: 45) words: “Our data reveal a 
remarkable degree of stability in America’s collective policy preferences.” Yet newer studies 
have shown that aggregate-level data often fails to identify change at the individual level. 
                                                          
4 Notable exceptions are Niemi and Westholm (1984) on Sweden and Togeby (2004) on Denmark. 
5 A notable exception is Hill and Kriesi (2001) who base their analysis on Swiss panel data. 
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Especially in situations where respondents move in different directions, individual-level 
change is balanced out at the aggregate level (Togeby, 2004; Druckman and Leeper, 2012). 
Despite this empirical disconnect between aggregate- and individual-level opinion dynamics, 
some scholars see the aggregate stability as a savior of democracy theory because no matter 
how irrational or random citizens may be in their preferences, the population as a whole 
appears rational. It may be an anchor for those who sideline opinion instability with 
nonattitudes, but theoretically it seems hard to align comprehensive individual-level attitude 
change with classic democratic thinking. Moreover, empirically, this does not seem to hold 
as a general premise, as the studies in this dissertation will show. 
 
2.2.2 The explanatory power of internal mechanisms: Political sophistication and opinion 
strength 
Ever since the classic debate of nonattitudes was introduced by Converse (1964), politically 
sophisticated citizens have been assigned a crucial role as an ‘issue public’ characterized by 
stable, ideology-driven attitudes. Political sophistication is connected to opinion change 
because it is closely related to opinion constraint, meaning the extent to which one’s 
political thoughts on similar issues are connected to each other (Luskin, 1987). First, because 
politically knowledgeable citizens know the political parties’ and candidates’ positions they 
can connect the parties and candidates with their positions on specific issues (Converse, 
1964; Krosnick, 1990). Second, because they are able to connect specific issues and broader 
political platforms, they report more stable attitudes (Lenz, 2009; Lenz, 2012).6 Third, and in 
a different vein, the theory of motivated reasoning argues that knowledgeable individuals 
hold more stable opinions as they are better at seeking out information that confirms their 
prior attitudes, view evidence consistent with their prior opinions as stronger, and spend 
more time counter arguing and dismissing evidence that opposes their prior opinions, 
regardless of its objective accuracy (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Lodge and Taber, 2013). Thus, in 
encountering new information, knowledgeable citizens are expected to reject new evidence 
and cling to the prior opinion, exhibiting greater attitude stability than less knowledgeable 
citizens.  
 
                                                          
6 This could take place for several reasons, please refer article 1 for an overview of the theorized mechanisms. 
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Although the theories of political awareness as a moderator of opinion change all anticipate 
that citizens who are more politically aware are less likely to change their opinions, the 
empirical evidence for this relationship is mixed, with some studies suggesting a modest 
relationship between the two (Lenz, 2012; Freeder et al., 2019), while other (mainly 
European) studies tend to find small differences in attitude stability among politically 
sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens (Hill and Kriesi, 2001; Kumlin, 2001). 
 
A second predisposition theorized to moderate attitude stability is opinion strength. This 
dissertation studies attitude strength through the operationalized term of issue importance. 
Issue importance is first and foremost associated with resistance to persuasive attempts 
(e.g., Krosnick, 1988; Schuman and Presser, 1981a). First, personally important attitudes 
should be more accessible than less important opinions because they motivate thinking 
about the personally important policy issues which should increase issue consistency across 
time  (e.g., Lecheler et al., 2009; Krosnick, 1990; Zuwerink and Devine, 1996; Krosnick, 1989). 
Second, issue importance is expected to motivate information gathering and thus encourage 
citizens to acquire greater and more accurate knowledge about a political issue. Thus, when 
making decisions related to policy, this updated and accurate information as well as one’s 
own attitudes are taken into account (e.g., Converse, 1964; Bolsen and Leeper, 2013; 
Walgrave and Lefevere, 2013). Third, the theory of motivated reasoning, as discussed above, 
is expected to apply also to strongly opinionated citizens (Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
Consequently, people with strong prior opinions are expected to reject new evidence and 
uphold their attitudes, thus showing greater attitude stability than citizens with weak 
attitudes.  
 
Despite the repeatedly stated assumption of a strong opinion causing less volatile opinions, 
the empirical body of evidence is limited. While studies of persuasion effects and 
information processing find consistent evidence of the moderating effect of opinion strength 
(Jacks and Devine, 2000; Lecheler et al., 2009; Leeper and Robison, 2018; Lodge and Taber, 
2013; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Plescia and Staniek, 2017), the few empirical studies 
investigating the link between subjective issue importance and opinion instability directly 
find substantively small and only partially statistically significant differences (Bassili, 1996; 
Krosnick, 1988; Prislin, 1996; Schuman and Presser, 1981b). The importance of political 
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sophistication and issue importance in explaining patterns of opinion change is a focus of the 
first article of this dissertation. 
 
2.2.3 The explanatory power of external mechanisms: Party cues and issue salience 
In a complex world, citizens use partisanship to filter political information. This makes 
parties and candidates play a vital role as providers of information. The seminal idea of party 
identification was introduced by Campbell et al. (1960) who considered partisanship as a 
‘perceptual screen’ through which day to day politics were interpreted. Through his seminal 
work The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (1992), Zaller aligns with Campbell et al. in 
assuming limited abilities of citizens to maneuver critically in meeting with party cues.  
 
Despite being consistently confirmed in studies of public opinion (e.g., Bartels, 2002; Chong 
and Druckman, 2007; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987), Campbell et al.’s idea of automated 
updating processes has been challenged by several revisionist schools. While one strand of 
studies argues that party cues function mainly as informational shortcuts (Chaiken, 1980; 
Kam, 2005; Sniderman, 2000) another strand of research points to party cues as facilitating 
motivated reasoning (Bullock, 2011; Lenz, 2009; Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010). 
 
In recent years, the theory of partisan bias inspired a big bulk of experimental framing effect 
studies, and also here the consensus is that large sections of the general public can be 
moved from one side to the other on a political issue depending on how parties or 
candidates frame it (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010). Yet 
challenging the framing effect studies is another line of research arguing that what is 
typically described as a framing effect is instead a learning effect.7 As citizens become aware 
of politicians’ policy judgments they tend to automatically defer to this position without 
requiring persuasive arguments to justify changing their views (Broockman and Butler, 2017; 
Lenz, 2009; Lenz, 2012). Related to the normative conception of democratic citizens as 
ideologically coherent and consistent, the theories of partisan bias mentioned this far 
                                                          
7 This line of research is also labelled the position adoption perspective. 
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undermine this ideal by assuming that citizens are easily moved by party cues related to the 
policy issue at hand.8 
 
Challenging the unequivocal effect of party cues on citizens is a literature focusing on the 
failure of most studies in this field to provide citizens with the ability to evaluate the 
information in elite communications. This strand of empirical studies highlights that 
exposure to relevant information may enable citizens to arrive at a policy position 
independently of political elites (Bullock, 2011; Gilens, 2001). This outweighing of 
partisanship with substantive information has also been found in recent US studies 
(Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014; Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2018). 
 
In a different vein, another line of studies has tried to overcome the inconclusive findings 
regarding party cues’ effects on public opinion by studying the effect of what parties do 
instead of focusing on what parties say. Using party manifestos, one group of studies 
indicate that voters fail to systematically comprehend changes in parties’ policy positions 
(Adams et al., 2011; Adams et al., 2014; Plescia and Staniek, 2017). Yet investigating long-
term links between policy change and partisan perception makes some scholars highlight 
that across time voters seem to comprehend policy change, yet the extent to which it affects 
citizens’ policy opinions remains unsettled (Carsey and Layman, 2006; Wlezien, 1995; Adams 
et al., 2012). Another series of studies focusing on actual shifts in policy position take 
advantage of natural experiments to study partisans’ reactions. These studies find that 
citizens respond to party cues, but only if they align with the political beliefs that the citizens 
hold (Seeberg et al., 2017; Slothuus, 2010; Leeper and Slothuus, 2016).  
 
Moreover, broadly accessible events such as exogenous shocks or international crises have 
been highlighted as scenarios where party cues may not be the driving force explaining 
opinion change (e.g., Feldman et al., 2015; Gamson, 1992; Lawrence and Bennett, 2001). Yet 
                                                          
8 One line of revisionist research focuses on  the methodological weaknesses of studies of framing effects, with 
the experimental setup arguably pushing opinion change through introducing respondents to one-sided 
information, failing to mimic a competitive information environment that reflects the real world (Sniderman 
and Theriault, 2004a; Kinder, 2007), not allowing participants to choose information for themselves (Druckman 
et al., 2012), and understating the effects due to respondents being primed by information from the real world 
of politics (Slothuus, 2016). 
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another group of studies argue the opposite, stating that in times of crisis party cues may 
play an important role in guiding public opinion as extraordinary uncertainties lead to a 
consensual elite supporting the political leadership and consequently few dissenting voices. 
In such situations, scholars argue that parallel opinion movements across voter segments are 
likely, as people who are ordinarily disposed to be critical of the government follow their 
parties and respond more favorably (Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Brody and Shapiro, 
1989). Importantly, however, this effect is expected to be limited in duration, returning to 
regular patterns of conflict as politics as usual returns (Brody and Shapiro, 1989). The effect 
of party cues in times of crisis is a focus in the third article of this dissertation. 
 
Despite little mention this far, the importance of salience is closely connected to the study of 
mass opinion change through the way it affects the flow of elite communication to the 
public. This mechanism is described by both Zaller (1992) and Togeby (2004) who argues 
that as an issue becomes salient in the public debate party endorsements are more 
efficiently communicated, thus reaching broader parts of the electorate. Depending on 
whether they are already in alignment with their party, their feeling of attachment to the 
party, and their political predispositions citizens are expected to respond differently to a 
more efficient information environment.  
 
Empirically, salience is confirmed to be an important facilitator for opinion change. Togeby 
(2004: 225-231) finds that policy issues receiving little public attention show comparatively 
high levels of individual stability. Still, due to a lack of dynamic data there are almost no 
studies looking into the moderating effects of party cues on opinion change as a policy issue 
changes from being low-salient to high-salient. This, however, is the analytical setup for the 
second article of this dissertation. 
2.2.4 The explanatory power of temporal mechanisms: external events 
In their review of the micro-macro disconnect in studies of public opinion, Druckman and 
Leeper (2012) contend that one factor contributing to opinion instability is the presence of a 
stimulus. In this dissertation, the effect of stimulus is studied through a focus on external 
events. Specifically, I study the effect of stimulus by investigating patterns of attitude change 
across two very different types of events: 1) the introduction and treatment of a 
controversial policy proposal, and 2) the external shock of a refugee crisis. There is little 
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theorizing on the effect of events on public opinion in general, possibly due to the scarce 
access to data related to a change in context. Yet a literature specializing on effects of 
international crises and terrorist attacks may be instructive for the study of public responses 
to the refugee crisis. Studies by Brody and Shapiro (1989) and Sniderman et al. (2019) 
highlight the consensual response by the public to sudden external crises. They argue that 
crises that require immediate response by the authorities create a situation where the 
opposition remains silent, and the media reports of cross-party consensus, leading 
government supporters and critics alike to become more supportive of government policy. 
This behavior among the political elite, however, is self-limiting. Once the sense of crisis 
fades politics-as-usual resumes, and arguably this should make party supporters return to 
their pre-crisis standpoints (Sniderman et al., 2019: 254-255). A plausible competing account 
is that such a critical event lead to a permanent shift in mass public opinions. Hutter and 
Kriesi (2019) argue that exogenous shocks such as the Euro crisis and the refugee crisis have 
this transformative potential. Still, whether this is actually the case remains an empirical 
question to be researched in the third article of this dissertation. 
 
The other external event that I study is assumed to have a very different dynamic on public 
opinion. Being an event taking place within the Norwegian political system, the process of 
implementing new policy is expected to be politically divisive, at least if the policy issue 
becomes salient in the public debate. In other words, the policy process produces public 
conflict within the political elite along familiar cleavage structures (Mueller, 1973: 209). The 
policy proposal to ban street begging was controversial and became highly salient in the 
political debate. Thus, the expectation is opinion change in direction of increased 
polarization due to more efficient communication of party cues as the policy proposal 
becomes salient. Moreover, the fact that one party shifted their policy position during the 
policy process provides a unique opportunity to also examine the impact of party shift on 
party supporters’ policy perceptions. This is the policy context within which I study the effect 
of party cues and issue salience in the second article of this dissertation.  
 
2.3 Summary of the theoretical discussion 
This dissertation takes a broad look at opinion change by studying both the magnitude of 
opinion change as well as the main mechanisms expected to affect citizens’ opinion stability. 
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Focusing on the mechanisms of change, the theoretical discussion has highlighted a number 
of traits that might affect citizens’ likelihood of changing their attitudes within a 
representative democratic system. This dissertation builds on two different lines of public 
opinion research: the internal studies focusing on individual traits that shape the way 
citizens perceive of politics, such as political awareness and issue importance, and the 
external studies focusing on the effects of policy endorsements and policy information as 
conveyed through party cues, issue salience, and the occurrence of events external to the 
individual.  
 
Based on the previous discussion, Figure 1 below graphically describes the two main 
explanatory frameworks of internal and external factors predicting opinion instability as well 
as their assumed connections with policy opinion change as studied in this dissertations’ 
three empirical articles. While the figure focuses strictly on mechanisms of attitude change, 
it is crucial to note that all three studies start of by investigating the direct effect of time on 
policy opinion. In the first study internal factors are tested, focusing on the moderating 
effects of political awareness and opinions strength on opinion instability. These effects are 
illustrated in the bottom of Figure 1, both expecting a negative causal relationship. The 
second study covers the external theoretical perspective by analyzing the relationship 
between party cues and opinion change, conditioned by the policy issue’s salience in the 
public debate, as illustrated in the upper left part of the figure. Finally, the last study 
examines the public response to a sudden external shock by utilizing the 2015 refugee crisis 
as a testable case. As it is conceivable that party support may moderate this relationship, an 
interaction effect is studied also here, as illustrated in the upper right part of Figure 1. In 
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3 Studying public opinion change in Norway 
 
3.1 The political system matters 
While public opinion studies originated in the US, the American literature on public opinion 
and the European literature on public opinion have developed in parallel. According to Saris 
and Sniderman (2004: 2):  
 
European researchers who have done work on [nonattitudes and political 
sophistication] have followed the work of their North American colleagues; North 
American researchers have not followed the work of their European colleagues as 
assiduously, to put it generously.  
 
Due to this lack of integration, points of difference and commonality remain largely 
underdeveloped.  
 
The development of theories attempting to detect and explain the volatility in people’s 
opinions was a solely American business to begin with. As a result, the literature on changes 
in public opinion has been dominated by US scholars. This is unsurprising given that this is 
where studies in public opinion originated in connection to the survey infrastructure of the 
American National Election Study (ANES) established at the University of Michigan in 1948 
(Burns, 2006). The US literature has relied heavily on data from the ANES and has thus been 
rather narrow in its empirical focus. Despite this, the studies’ conclusions have often had a 
universal outlook (e.g., Achen and Bartels, 2016; Converse, 1964). Thus, many of the 
dystopic conclusions about voters’ lack of real attitudes formed the natural starting point for 
European scholars who had started to grapple with similar research questions.9 The 
scattered studies of opinion change within the European context – many of them indicating 
more stable political attitudes among citizens – have failed to lead to further theory 
development. Nonetheless, an obvious contrast between the US and Europe is the political 
system, and I concur with other scholars who argue that the system is consequential for the 
                                                          
9 There is a large body of European literature focusing on Converse’s theories of mass opinion. Still, it seems to 
me that it is not the nonattitude thesis that has attracted most interest among European scholars. Rather, the 
theory of attitude constraint, meaning the coherence between opinions on different policy issues within the 
same issue field, has been in focus. The concept of constraint is more closely related to issues like political 
ideology and political values, which have been a prominent focus among European public opinion scholars. 
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conclusions one arrives at in answering questions on opinion dynamics (e.g., Campbell and 
Valen, 1961; Granberg and Holmberg, 1988; Niemi and Westholm, 1984).  
 
Similar to the governments of most European countries, Norway is a multi-party system. 
According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), a crucial aspect of a multi-party system is the 
multidimensional nature of core issues, also called cleavages. Breaking with the two-party 
US system where all issues are interpreted as fitting into a left—right policy space, the 
European multi-party states see core issues that cut across party lines and thus more 
complex patterns of friends and foes develop. This makes the context within which citizens 
form their attitudes very different and makes a valid case for why one might expect to find 
differing patterns of opinion formation across party systems. 
 
Based on the above description of the party landscape and the conflict structures, Norway 
reads like a case where it should be hard for citizens to hold stable opinions. Yet in their 
early comparative study of the Norwegian and American political systems, Campbell and 
Valen (1961: 508) conclude that:  
 
(1) differences between parties in stands on issues are both greater and clearer in 
Norway than in the Unites States; (2) Norwegian parties are more specific than 
American parties in appealing to various groups and sections of the electorate; (3) 
differences in policies between the parties are more effectively brought to the 
attention of the public in Norway than in the Unites States.  
 
Needless to say, both political systems have witnessed important changes since Campbell 
and Valen’s study. The number of parties in Norway’s parliament has grown from six to nine, 
increasing fragmentation and possibly making it harder for citizens to orient themselves 
politically (Knutsen, 2017a),10 while the party polarization seen in the US in the last two 
decades has arguably made citizens hold stronger and more rigid opinions (e.g., 
Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015). Given these developments, one might argue that quite 
                                                          
10 Yet these new parties all have a clear profile, the Progress Party being an anti-immigrant party, the Green 
party being an environmentalist party and the Socialist Left Party having a clear ‘new politics’ profile, 
supporting a liberal immigration policy and being environment-oriented (Knutsen, 2017a). 
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possibly, the systemic differences framing the political environment in which citizens’ form 
their opinions have narrowed. Despite these developments, a recent study by Freeder et al. 
(2019) still finds support for Converse’s (1964; 1970) conclusion that great segments of the 
American population lack opinions on political matters, and Berglund’s (2004) and Aardal 
and Bergh’s (2015: 63-65) analyses of the stability of party identification and issue 
dimensions in Norway indicate no increase in instability in the period where the new parties 
gained influence through elections. 
 
Further qualifying Campbell and Valen’s (1961) observations, Valen and Narud (2007) 
propose the conditional party mandate model, emphasizing that parties compete for voters 
in a multidimensional policy space and that the relative importance of the various 
dimensions determines the parties’ positions in this space. Within this system, parties focus 
on issues where their policies are well-known and supported by their voters, thereby 
sending clear cues to their citizens11. 
 
Two thorough replications of the Converse study in a multi-party context were conducted by 
Niemi and Westholm (1984) and Granberg and Holmberg (1988), with each comparing 
Swedish and US election data. They find that the stability on public policy issues over time is 
higher in the Swedish mass electorate than what Converse observed in the US, and they find 
that as opposed to the findings in the US, people in Sweden have opinions that are more 
constrained and more closely linked to their voting behavior. Both studies assign this 
difference to a structural factor – the party system – concluding along the same lines as 
Campbell and Valen (1961) that “parties in Sweden give clearer, more consistent cues about 
where to stand on issues” (Niemi and Westholm, 1984: 65). More recently, similar 
conclusions have been drawn based on a comprehensive study of Danish voters (Togeby, 
2004).12  
 
                                                          
11 Other scholars have labeled this ‘issue ownership’ (e.g., Narud and Valen, 2001; Petrocik, 1996). 
12 The accumulation of European studies of opinion change conducted in Scandinavia is striking and arguably 
connected to the strong standing of political behavior research in the Nordic context, with close collaborations 
being formed between high-profile scholars in the Nordic countries and those in the US in the early days of 
public opinion research (for a review, see von Schoultz, 2015). 
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Compared to the comprehensive studies of public opinion formation in Sweden and 
Denmark, the Norwegian situation is understudied. The few studies considering opinion 
change in Norway have mainly focused on aggregated attitude dimensions and party 
identification, features in which the international literature has identified the most stable 
types of attitudes. Unsurprisingly then, they confirm the patterns of opinion stability found 
in Norway’s neighboring countries (Aardal, 1999; Berglund, 2004). Yet this lack of a proper 
understanding of Norwegian citizens’ opinion instability on policy issues underscores the 
novel empirical contribution that this dissertation makes to the research on mass opinion 
change. 
 
3.2 The case of Norway: A least likely laboratory for studying opinion change? 
As has been laid out in previous sections, the history of public opinion change studies is one 
of clear theoretical expectations from the dominant American literature and scattered 
empirical findings and scant theory building on the state of citizens’ attitudinal volatility in 
the European literature. Thus, studies of European countries are high in demand. This 
dissertation meets this demand with an in-depth study of political opinion change in 
Norway. This section provides an introduction to the Norwegian political system and related 
characteristics that are important to understanding the context within which the citizens 
studied in this dissertation form their political attitudes. 
 
 A consensual multi-party system 
Norway, like the other Nordic countries, is historically characterized by a five-party system 
model wherein the major party families are included: conservative, liberal, agrarian, social 
democrat, and communist/left socialist13. The two biggest parties alternating power have 
been the Conservative Party and the Labor Party. Yet the Norwegian party system has seen 
increased fragmentation in terms of effective numbers of parties and it is the Nordic country 
that has experienced the greatest polarization from the 1950s to the 2000s (Knutsen, 2017a: 
74). The new parties emerging are the radical right Progress Party, the environmentalist 
Green Party, and the traditionalist Christian People’s Party, although the latter was originally 
established in Norway already in 1933. Important for understanding the Norwegian case is 
the effect that the dominant position of the Labor Party in the decades after the Second 
                                                          
13 The Norwegian left socialist party was not a successor of communist parties, but was established as a splinter 
party from the Labor Party in 1961 (Knutsen, 2017a: 51).  
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World War has had on the development of the universal welfare state with its income-
maintenance schemes and social services, incorporations of various interests through 
corporative arrangements, and the development of a consensual democracy (Knutsen, 
2017b). 
 
Norway and the other Nordic countries are denoted as consensual democracies in the 
comparative literature (Lijphart, 2012). This concept relates to the fairly proportional 
organization of party votes into parliamentary seats and lays the groundwork for the multi-
party system just described. Moreover, the Scandinavian parliamentary governments have 
two distinct features. The first is the high prevalence of minority governments. Counting all 
governments from 1884, Norway has been led by a minority government 62% of the time. 
The second is the frequent occurrence of (stable) one-party governments. A one-party 
minority government is the most frequent government composition in Norwegian 
parliamentary history, present 46% of the time. Yet, in spite of minority rule being the norm, 
stability and good performance characterize the Norwegian governing system (Heidar and 
Rasch, 2017). In the literature, minority governments are often connected with party 
polarization. In the Norwegian (and greater Scandinavian) context, the presence of a 
relatively centrist social democratic party with great support in general elections in the post-
war period accounts for most of the one-party minority governments. Nonetheless, the last 
five elections have resulted in coalition governments. 
 
Connecting these structural traits to the issue of citizen opinion formation, the Norwegian 
Power and Democracy Project argues that the minority parliamentary system of government 
– leading to coalition government and the development of multilevel governance at the 
European, state, and local level – makes it harder for citizens to assign responsibility for 
changes in policy and reforms to the right actor. This challenges the ability of citizens to hold 
political actors responsible for their actions through elections (Østerud and Selle, 2006). That 
said, the parliamentary processes around many policy issues, like legislation and 
developments of plans and strategies, are marked by a high degree of openness toward 
stakeholders and the general public, thus setting the stage for an enlightened political 
discussion that may enable citizens to hold the politicians accountable (Heidar and Rasch, 
2017). 
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Social cleavage structures are important for understanding which central political conflicts 
between groups are important in society. A defining cleavage in the Norwegian political 
system is a center – periphery cleavage, which manifests in an agrarian party, a Christian 
party and a liberal party. Norway is a vast country consisting of many sparsely populated 
regions, which separates linguistic and religious groups along territorial lines (Lipset and 
Rokkan, 1967). Regional differences in voting behavior have been attributed to three 
countercultures that are mainly located in the western and southern regions of Norway: the 
rural language (nynorsk) movement, the temperance and prohibition movement, and the 
dominance of Lutheran orthodoxy and pietism. This has led to the Christian People’s Party 
and the Liberal Party receiving strong support in these regions, whereas class voting is less 
prevalent. Out of these regional differences also comes a religious cleavage, with the 
strongest support for Christian People’s Party found within the Lutheran Church. Today, 
however, these countercultures are clearly weakened (Knutsen, 2017b: 80-81).  
 
For Norway, the left—right economic cleavage has been important historically. Comparative 
analyses of class voting have documented that traditional class voting was, and still is, more 
prevalent in the Scandinavian countries than in other democracies, despite a marked decline 
from 1960 onwards in connection to the great changes in class structure (Knutsen, 2017b: 
83-90). Moreover, the urban—rural conflict between peasants and the urban population 
related to the commodity market created distinct agrarian parties in the Nordic countries. 
These parties articulate the economic interests of farmers and find their base of support in 
rural areas. In Norway, recent centralization reforms of the police and hospitals, as well as 
municipal and regional mergers, has been connected to a lasting national surge in support 
for the agrarian Center Party, which resists these structural changes (Holdal et al., 2019). 
 
Relating the structural cleavages to value orientations, the moral value dimension most 
important to the Christian People’s Party and the economic left—right value dimension (as 
well as the urban—rural conflict) are often referred to as ‘old politics’ as they capture the 
essence of the traditional lines of conflict. Yet a number of post-industrial conflicts denoted 
‘new politics’ also shape the contemporary political system of Norway. Here, the value 
conflicts between environmental and economic growth values and immigration orientation 
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have been especially important. The environmental issue in Norway has provoked the 
creation of the Green Party. Yet compared to other European Green parties, the Norwegian 
Green Party was established late and lacks electoral success (Knutsen, 2017a: 68).14 And 
although the rightist Progress Party was originally established as an anti-tax and anti-
bureaucracy party, they reoriented their political focus to become first and foremost an anti-
immigration party in the 1980s. Empirical analyses find that the Progress Party voters reflect 
the most restrictive orientations toward immigration policies, whereas the Green Party and 
the Socialist Left Party have the voters with the most environmentalist orientations 
(Knutsen, 2017b: 100). To account for the multidimensional character of the political system, 
this dissertation covers all the cleavages presented here in the empirical analyses of political 
opinion change. As such, this study offers a comprehensive analysis of opinion change across 
all social cleavages in the Norwegian political system. 
 
 A rich, universal welfare state 
Citizens’ political outlooks are not only shaped by their country’s political system; a country’s 
welfare regime type also reveals characteristics that are relevant to understanding what 
shapes citizens’ attitudes. The Nordic model is characterized by early social policy schemes 
from the late 19th century, preparing the groundwork for the development of respect for 
individual liberty and traditions of collectivism and community within an ethnically 
homogeneous population. In the post-war period, the Nordic model has told the story of a 
society that has been successful in uniting economic growth and competitiveness through a 
strong public sector while promoting broad public participation in the economic and social 
spheres of society. Relevant to the research on democratic participation is that the Nordic 
model, through substantial levels of taxation and extensive redistribution of wealth and 
resources, offers a social safety net, free public education, and universal health services. By 
ensuring that all citizens have a minimum of living conditions and education, the welfare 
system has been argued to facilitate high levels of civic participation, both in the economic 
and social spheres of society (Syvertsen et al., 2014; West Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). 
 
                                                          
14 One important reason why the Green Party has been a rather marginal force in Norwegian politics is the fact 
that the Socialist Left Party has been successful on coopting this conflict dimension through supporting 
environmentalist issues. 
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In Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of welfare states, he defines the Nordic welfare model 
as ‘social democratic,’ highlighting its high degree of egalitarianism and universalism. The 
welfare system has had a transformative agenda focused on combatting differences in class 
and status through offering the same welfare state provisions to all. This encourages the 
participation and inclusion of citizens in the political and cultural public spheres (Syvertsen et 
al., 2014). That said, the golden age of the social democratic welfare state ended in the 
1980s, followed by far-reaching challenges such as the dominance of a neo-liberal ideology, 
globalization, changing demographics, economic crises, and the question of upholding the 
welfare system in light of these changes. Yet the model has proven dynamic, adapting to 
new context. Of great importance for the upholding of the welfare state is the broad support 
for its guiding principles across parties of all political stripes in Norway. In fact, in some of 
the most expansive periods of the welfare state, a conservative government has been in 
charge (Knutsen, 2017a; West Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017).  
 
 One area in which the Norwegian welfare state stands out is its economy. Norwegian Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is by far the biggest among the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and the reason for this gap is 
the asset revenues created by the oil industry. This gives Norwegian authorities significant 
financial latitude and it is also an important contributor to the fact that in 2013, Norway was 
the only OECD country to see a 20 percentage point surplus of revenue after public 
expenditure was extracted15 (Hansen, 2016). This exceptional economic situation is 
accompanied by a large public sector. In 2013, 30 % of Norway’s workforce was employed in 
the public sector. Moreover, in terms of public expenses, half of them are being allocated to 
different welfare schemes, signifying Norway’s position as an extensive welfare state. And if 
we include state transfers to the municipalities, which are also mainly used to fund welfare 
services, close to two-thirds of the state’s budget is reserved for public social policy (Hansen, 
2016: 74-79). 
 
Another characteristic of Norwegian society is its low level of income inequality. Estimating 
the Gini index of inequality before and after tax, comparative studies find that the size of the 
                                                          
15 Based on 2013 numbers from the OECD Economic Outlook database. 
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public sector in a country is inversely related to the level of social inequality (OECD, 2015). As 
such, the Nordic universal welfare states have been rather successful in securing an equal 
distribution of economic well-being. Nonetheless, OECD (2015) warns that since the mid-
1980s, income inequality has been  growing across all member countries, including Norway. 
 
 A media welfare state? 
Although not a part of the traditional description of the Nordic model, the media system also 
warrants some attention given that it constitutes an important institution in modern society 
and has a great influence on citizens’ knowledge and the information they receive about 
political matters. In their authoritative study on classifying media systems, Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) situate Norway (and the other Nordic countries) within the democratic 
corporatist model, which is characterized by news media reaching large segments of the 
population, relatively high degrees of independence between the political elite and the 
media, strong professionalization, and strong state intervention in the form of strong public 
service broadcasters and subsidies for the press. Studying the Nordic media system 
exclusively, Syvertsen and colleagues (2014) argue that it rests on four pillars: universal and 
egalitarian services, editorial freedom, a cultural policy that extends to the media, and a 
preference for policy solutions that are consensual and durable and involve cooperation 
between both public and private stakeholders.  
 
Both the party press and the public broadcasting institutions were perceived as crucial 
vehicles by the social democratic movement to achieve the welfare state. Crucial 
infrastructure to disperse information, such as the postal systems and the 
telecommunication networks, were organized as public services from early on, and radio and 
television were institutionalized as public service monopolies between 1920 and 1960. This 
political control over communications infrastructure led to a homogeneity of culture and 
perspectives as citizens watched and listened to the same content on very few state-owned 
or strongly subsidized channels. That said, the Norwegian media system is also characterized 
by having one of the most well developed systems for (a heavily subsidized) private local 
press, as well as systematic subsidizing of second-largest newspapers in areas where there 
are several newspapers covering the same area (Syvertsen et al., 2014: , ch. 3). This arguably 
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secures diversity of political opinions as well as geographical diversity, and thus a more 
pluralistic stream of communication. 
 
Moreover, communication is crucial to a democracy because it is vital for legitimacy. Norms 
and values are debated and negotiated through the media system, and it is the means by 
which the political elite can interact with the broader public. In this regard, a publicly 
regulated media system like the Norwegian can keep undemocratic forces in check and is to 
a large degree held accountable by society. The communication system also plays an 
important role as an agent of cohesion and social bonding through framing the narrative of 
the nation, defining in-groups and out-groups, and nurturing feelings of inclusion and 
exclusion. These studies of communication systems have focused on traditional media. Yet 
even newer studies focusing on digital media point to the unifying characteristics of the 
Nordic countries. Maier-Rabler (2008: 58) singles out a sociodemocratic information culture, 
identifying its key value to be that “information is a precondition for the political 
emancipation of the individual.” 
 
Comparative studies of different broadcasters tend to find that public broadcasters, like NRK 
in Norway, creates a more informed citizenry. The scope of prime time news programming is 
largest in countries with a public broadcaster (Aalberg et al., 2010).  Aalberg and Curran 
(2012) find that citizens who are not preoccupied with following domestic news and who are 
not interested in politics still hold a good level of knowledge of domestic affairs within 
countries with public broadcasting systems. Comparatively, in countries where commercial 
media controls the market (like the US) citizens who are politically uninterested are largely 
uninformed about current affairs. Soroka et al. (2013) show in a comparative study of six 
countries that those exposed to public television news learn more about hard news than 
those exposed to private television news for the same amount of time. This effect is even 
stronger in countries like Norway, where the share of public funding of broadcasters is high 
and where their de jure independence from the government is secured. Taken together, the 
characteristics of the Norwegian communication and media system, both in terms of 
securing equal access to information as well as educating citizens through a public 
broadcaster, lay the foundations for an enlightened citizenry that receives political 
information and is informed about day-to-day politics. 
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Overall, Norway is a consensual and multi-party representative democracy that ensures a 
close connection between the will of the people and the party portfolio. Moreover, it is an 
extensive welfare state, securing equality and similar opportunities for Norwegian citizens 
irrespective of their background. Similarly, the media system fosters equal access to 
information and news through a public, yet independent, broadcaster. And fueled by 
revenues from the oil industry, the country’s economic situation is exceptionally good. I 
argue that within this stable system, citizens should have ample opportunities to develop 
stable and politically coherent attitudes, making Norway a least likely case for the study of 
opinion change. Yet the extent to which it is actually so remains an empirical question for 
this dissertation to find out.  
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4 Methodology and data 
 
This dissertation employs quantitative large-N research designs to examine the scope and 
determinants of political opinion change across a range of policy issues in Norway. This 
section starts with introducing the characteristics of the data, underlining its prerogative by 
contrasting it with the conventional data used in public opinion research. Then I move 
toward the specifics of the data and methodological matters related to this dissertation. In 
all three articles, the unit of analysis is individuals from a random sample of Norway’s 
population. In the following, I present the main quantitative technique utilized and discuss 
its main contributions and challenges. Moreover, I present and discuss the sources of data 
utilized and introduce the type of survey questions used to analyze opinion change in the 
three empirical studies. 
 
Two kinds of questions form the core of every study on change. For this dissertation, the first 
question asks: How do opinions change over time? This is a descriptive question and asks us 
to characterize each person’s pattern of change over time. The second question is relational, 
asking whether we can predict differences in the observed individual-level changes in 
opinion. Applied to this project, a relevant question is whether different types of people 
experience different patterns of change. In terms of the analytical framework, I follow Singer 
and Willett (2003) and consider these research questions to be of a hierarchical nature. First, 
within-individual change over time is situated at level one, where each individual is clustered 
within survey waves. Second, the study of between-individual differences in change is 
situated at level two, relating predictors to an inter-individual difference in change. 
 
4.1 Panel data analyses on public opinion change 
As this thesis is preoccupied with understanding opinion change, it is crucial to be able to 
incorporate time into the design. Thus, all the empirical articles in this thesis are based on 
longitudinal data – specifically, panel data from Norway. Panel data is characterized by 
containing “measures of the same variables from numerous units observed repeatedly 
through time” (Finkel, 1995: 1). The panel survey design was developed within the political 
behavior tradition in the US in the 1930s. It was mainly based on election study surveys with 
a two-wave pre—post design where parts of the electorate were contacted again in the 
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following election. Yet due to the principal mode of data collection at that time – knocking 
on doors and later on calling people — such endeavors were costly, and thus the supply of 
panel data was limited. With the digitalization of modern society, the possibility of 
conducting surveys through web-based solutions has revolutionized the survey industry, 
making panel data more affordable and easier to collect and thereby offering great 
improvements to the study of public opinion.16  
 
Due to the historical costs of panel data, many studies of opinion change have been based 
on cross-sectional data. Panel data have two main advantages over cross-sectional data 
when it comes to internal validity: 1) the ability to model the direction of causal 
relationships; and 2) the ability to control for potential time-invariant confounders. This is 
done through explicitly building in the time dimension of the causal process, allowing for 
stronger causal inferences to be made. The fixed effects model has been the preferred panel 
model within public opinion research as it successfully holds time-invariant factors constant, 
thus controlling for all possible observed and unobserved time-invariant confounders. 
Moreover, fixed effects models allow us to relax the assumption that all respondents have 
the same starting point. Still, they omit all time-invariant factors, thus failing to allow 
respondents to change their opinions at a different pace (Bell and Jones, 2015). A newer 
branch of panel modelling denoted growth modelling offers a more flexible way of modeling 
change that is more successful in taking omitted variable bias into account. I take advantage 
of this new analytical model in the three empirical articles of this dissertation. 
 
A large body of literature on opinion change is based on experimental data that are mainly 
collected through surveys. Despite the superior features of experimental designs in terms of 
their internal validity, controlling for confounding effects, panel data surpass most 
experimental studies in terms of external validity by being situated in the real world. A trait 
of the survey experiments that have typically been looking at communication effects is that 
they offer respondents one-sided presentations to evoke either support for a policy or 
opposition to it, but not both, thereby failing to represent a realistic information 
                                                          
16 Of course, other developments within the survey industry have not been equally positive. Low response rates 
and problems related to self-selection of respondents are two issues that threaten the generalizability of 
surveys and need to be treated with care (Berinsky, 2017) 
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environment in which opposing parties compete to put across their point of view 
(Sniderman and Theriault, 2004). Also, by offering all respondents equal information, such 
experiments fall short in reflecting the fact that today, citizens self-select their exposure to 
political matters and are thus not equally exposed to party cues or policy information 
(Druckman et al., 2012; Bennett and Iyengar, 2008). One problematic aspect of this is that 
one risks exaggerating the effect of these manipulations on opinion change. Thus, a great 
feature of observational panel data is that they measure citizens’ opinions in ‘the real world’ 
as they interact with this complex information environment. 
 
Another great opportunity that panel data offer is the possibility for natural experiments in 
the sense that events may occur during the data collection that shape public opinion. A great 
opportunity, which I take advantage of in two of the empirical articles in this dissertation, is 
to be able to say something about change before and after such a real-life stimulus takes 
place. With reference to abrupt and dramatic incidents, such as terrorist attacks or natural 
disasters, scholars argue that events may create big shifts in the public mood overnight 
(Albertson and Gadarian, 2015b; Stimson, 2004; Finseraas and Listhaug, 2013; Sniderman et 
al., 2014; Vasilopoulos et al., 2015). This contrasts more slow-moving developments, like the 
implementation of reforms, which can also lead to opinion change, but where the change is 
likely to happen across a longer period of time. I study both types of events and their effects 
on public opinion formation, by first analyzing the development of public opinion 
throughout an entire process of policy formation and then, by investigating the public 
reaction to the 2015 refugee crisis in Norway.  
 
Despite the great advantages of repeated observational data, they too present an 
incomplete picture of what is happening in reality. While change happens continuously, the 
respondents are only observed at discrete points in time. Relatedly, as respondents enter 
the panel, processes of interest may already be happening, and as such, the baseline 
attitude may be anything but a neutral standpoint (Andreß et al., 2013). This makes it clear 
that time may also be biased, highlighting the need to be critical of start and end points in 
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4.2 Estimating panel models of opinion change 
 
As mentioned briefly above, one of the great advantages of using panel data is the ability to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity even if it is correlated with the variables in the model. 
Unobserved heterogeneity is one part of the error term in a panel model, reflecting all the 
unknown factors that are not controlled for by the independent variables in the model, but 
which in fact influence Y. The repeated observations of the same respondents allow me to 
control for all — both observed and unobserved — characteristics  of the respondents that 
are constant across time. Put differently, each respondent serves as its own control. Under 
the assumption of no unobserved heterogeneity, pairs of individuals who share predictor 
profiles should have identical outcomes (Singer and Willett, 2003: 461). With my data, where 
I consider unobserved heterogeneity due to omitted variables and measurement error to be 
a potential problem for estimating sound models, this is good news. It can incorporate 
heterogeneity into the model through allowing each respondent to have different starting 
points (intercepts) (like fixed effects and random effects models), but at the same time 
allowing respondents to change opinions at a different pace over time while taking into 
account that repeated observations within individuals are not independent from each other 
(Singer and Willett 2003). This flexibility in incorporating heterogeneity at the individual level 
of the model is another great advantage of panel modelling. As my interest is in studying the 
scope of opinion change and differences across groups, my research questions necessitate 
heterogeneity in the effect of time, allowing each respondent to change at a different pace. 
 
As I touched upon in the literature section, measurement error has played a central part in 
the debate on opinion change. Applicable to all survey research, measurement error is a 
concern related to unreliable measures and the interview situation. In panel data, the error 
terms tend to correlate over time as we observe the same respondents repeatedly. 
Moreover, panel data also risks measurement errors related to heteroscedastic error terms, 
meaning that the variance of the error term is not constant across time, as assumed. To deal 
with this, I apply robust standard errors, clustered for each respondent. Cluster-robust 
standard errors assume that observations are independent across clusters (i.e., respondents) 
but not necessarily within clusters. Thus, we control out any form of serial dependence 
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within clusters. That said, post hoc corrections are always second best. Having data free of 
measurement error is always the preferred option, no matter how unattainable in reality. 
 
As for the data used in this dissertation, panel attrition is a possible challenge, as will be 
elaborated upon below. Given this, a great advantage of some panel models is that they can 
handle unbalanced panels (meaning data where units attrite over time) as long as the 
dropout is not systematically connected to the given characteristics of the respondents 
(missing at random: MAR). Through specifying maximum likelihood estimation, both 
complete cases and incomplete cases are used to calculate log likelihood, and this should 
result in unbiased parameter estimates (Enders, 2010; Graham, 2009). As mentioned above I 
mainly utilize a type of panel model called growth model which allows for a flexible handling 
of unbalanced data. The specific model choices for each article are treated in the article 
review below. 
 
4.3 Data on the Norwegian public: The Norwegian Citizen Panel and the Norwegian 
National Election Study 
In order to test hypotheses about variations in opinion stability over time, robust sources of 
data are required. First, the individual-level dataset must involve the measurement of 
political opinions. Second, the data must be an individual-level panel, as opposed to some 
kind of repeated cross-sectional survey. Third, any dataset must ask the same respondents 
the same questions two or more times. Although most major survey data collection efforts 
fail to satisfy these data requirements, Norway offers two publicly available datasets that 
both hold population-representative samples of the Norwegian population: the Norwegian 
Citizen Panel (NCP) and the Norwegian National Election Study (NNES). Both surveys offer 
the great advantage of monitoring political opinions on a wide array of policy issues across 
time (28 items in the Norwegian Election Study and 12 items in the Norwegian Citizen 
Panel), allowing me to study the mechanisms of opinion stability on an exhaustive set of 
political issues that are more and less salient in the public debate. These two data sources 
allow me to conduct a comprehensive study of policy opinion change and its determinants in 
Norway.17 Taken together, panel data from Norway offer rare opportunities to properly 
                                                          
17 As mentioned earlier, Berglund (2004) and Aardal (1999) have studied opinion change in the Norwegian 
electorate. However, their focus has been on the stability of party identification and opinion change on 
ideological dimensions and not on attitudes toward specific policy items per se. 
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study research questions concerning changes over time and draw inferences with stronger 
internal validity than cross-sectional data allow for and stronger external validity than survey 
experimental data allow for. 
 
All three articles in this dissertation are based solely or partly on new and original panel 
survey data from the NCP. The data offer the most comprehensive panel data collection of 
political opinions in Norway. NCP is a new web-based panel maintained and administered by 
the Digital Social Science Core Facility (DIGSSCORE) at the University of Bergen that was 
established in 2013 for research purposes. NCP is a representative opt-out panel where the 
participants have been recruited through random sampling of 25 000 individuals from the 
official National Population Registry and are representative of both the online and offline 
population older than 18 years in Norway18 (Skjervheim and Høgestøl, 2013). Panel members 
were recruited by mail in two steps. New recruitment rounds relevant to this dissertation 
were carried out prior to the third wave and prior to the eight wave (Skjervheim and 
Høgestøl, 2014; Skjervheim and Høgestøl, 2017). 
 
The type of questions one asks and the level of specificity one chooses for measuring public 
opinion is important for the answers that one will get (Saris and Sniderman, 2004). As 
pointed out by Berinsky (2017: 311), there is often a mismatch between the level of 
specificity in the attitudes that we would like people to have and the attitudes they actually 
possess. Berinsky argues for a mezzo level of specificity; not so general as to be devoid of 
content, and not so specific that the survey items risk creating opinions where none exists. 
Yet there exists no agreement among public opinion scholars on what is the preferable level 
of measurement. While some focus on issue dimensions, typically aggregating single issue 
into multi-item measures, others focus on political values, yet the bulk of studies of opinion 
change bases itself on people’s ratings of different policy items. In this dissertation I follow 
the majority of studies and make use of policy items that vary in their degree of specificity.  
 
                                                          
18 The Norwegian Population Registry includes everyone born in Norway as well as its former and current 
inhabitants. The extracted data from the registry were a) last name; b) first name; c) address; d) gender; and e) 
age.  
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In the initial stages of this dissertation, I was able to develop 12 original policy opinion items 
within three designated political issue fields — welfare, immigration and environmental 
issues — to be included in the NCP from wave 1. In this process, I had three overarching 
considerations. First, to ensure continuity with previous studies in this domain and the 
possibility of direct comparison, one part of the questions was borrowed from the 
Norwegian National Election Study (NNES) and a panel study conducted as part of the Danish 
Democracy and Power study (Magtudredningen). Second, the other questions were 
developed with the aim of monitoring citizens’ opinions on political matters that had the 
potential to become salient and that represent the political times in which we live. Third, to 
minimize measurement error, I framed attitudinal questions with the goal of securing equal 
validity of the measurement across time. This was done by formulating items that would be 
valid irrespective of the actual policy change on any given topic. The 12 policy items were 
included into the Norwegian Citizen Panel for six waves (and some were asked across 
additional waves). All 12 policy opinion items are utilized in this dissertation, together with 
one additional opinion item that is also asked repeatedly. 
 
 For the three studies making up this dissertation, the first 10 waves of NCP are utilized in 
different constellations, dependent on the question under scrutiny. The number of waves 
used in the article varies between four and seven. And although in the world of surveys 
having seven waves of panel data is exceptional, it is not excessively much in the world of 
modelling. Due to the limited number of data waves utilized, as well as the change-measures 
used, most models are estimated based on the assumption that the individual movement in 
opinions is linear across time. In other words, I hold that the rate in which opinions change is 
identical over time. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the three studies of opinion change do 
not distinguish between processes of opinion formation, indicating a change from no 
attitude to having an attitude, and changes in an existing attitude in their empirical analyses.  
 
The NNES data are used together with the NCP data in Article 1 to map the scope of opinion 
change. The NNES has been collecting data on Norwegian public opinion every four years 
since the 1957 general election and it is maintained and administered by the Institute for 
Social Research in Oslo. Like the NCP, the NNES is a representative panel with random 
sampling recruitment based on the electoral register of each election. As opposed to the 
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NCP, the NNES collects data through face-to-face interviews and phone interviews, 
conducted by Statistics Norway19 (Statistics Norway, 2015). In this dissertation, I make use of 
two-wave panel data collected in connection with the 2009 and 2013 general elections to 
Norway.  
 
 Measuring opinions 
Within political science research, scholars have typically used three types of measures to 
assess attitudes. The most commonly used measure asks people to report whether they like 
or dislike (favor or oppose) an attitude object. This measure is direct in terms of registering 
citizens’ opinions, yet it relies on respondents being willing to respond to the policy 
questions asked and risk social desirability responses. A second set of survey items asks 
respondents about their preferences toward policies or political candidates. It reads very 
similar to the first type of measure. Yet, a crucial difference is the fact that citizens’ attitudes 
are assessed indirectly through a comparative evaluation where respondents choose from 
among a list of options or rank order these same options. Given its setup, it is assumed to be 
better at avoiding social desirability bias and acquiescence bias. However, one drawback is 
that by researchers offering the respondents a fixed set of policy considerations, they force 
the respondents to choose the alternative that most closely matches their (real) preference. 
As such, preference measures may risk being less precise than more direct measures of 
attitudes (given that the scales are exhaustive). A third type of attitudinal measure uses 
attitude-expressive behaviors as indicators of attitudes, typically measured through self-
reports about financially supporting an organization or a political candidate. In using this 
type of measure, one must assume that respondents can accurately predict their own 
behavior and are willing to do so. However, this may be inaccurate — especially 
retrospective reports of past behavior. Such measures indirectly assess attitudes and have 
the drawback of being influenced by other factors as well (Holbrook, 2011: 142-144).  
 
This dissertation bases itself exclusively on the first type of attitudinal measures when 
modelling mass opinion change and I follow the public opinion research tradition developed 
                                                          
19 From the 2017 general election, half of the respondents are surveyed through web-based solutions while the 
other half is still interviewed. However, the two waves used in this dissertation are from 2009 and 2013, so the 
old survey mode applies to this data material. 
 
- 45 - 
 
by the American National Election Study (ANES) and focus on policy opinions. The survey 
items are formulated as directional statements, like: ‘The state should contribute to reducing 
income inequalities in society’ or ‘We should not allow oil and gas extraction in the Lofoten, 
Vesterålen, and Senja areas,’ followed either by a seven-point (NCP items) or a five-point 
(NNES items) bipolar Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree.’ 
Although there are critiques of the use of directional statements related especially to 
acquiescence bias (e.g., Saris et al., 2010), we ensure comparability with previous studies as 
almost every study of the subject of opinion instability has been based on such ANES-style 
items. In terms of the level of generality, the policy statements asked through the two 
surveys range from concerns about specific policy issues related to special groups (e.g., 
granting social rights to refugees), to the division of labor between different organizations in 
society (e.g., transferring state workplaces to the districts), to general issues without any 
reference to a specific group or person (e.g., consumption reduction to lower emissions). 
Thus, the scope of policy issues utilized in this dissertation is comprehensive in terms of the 
actual items, political issue fields, and the level of specificity. 
 
The range of policy items vary in important ways that may affect the nature of opinion 
instability measured. First, the policy items vary in terms of their proximity to core 
ideological matters, regulating the ability of citizens to connect the items with party politics. 
Second, they differ in terms of their implementation status in the period studied, arguably 
affecting opinions. Third, they vary in their linguistic clarity as survey items, arguably 
affecting the presence of measurement error. Although expectations of opinion stability 
often are guided by the policy issues under study, this study is preoccupied with general 
patterns of opinion stability within a polity, and thus pay very limited attention to 
differences across political issue fields. 
 
In this dissertation I use single items instead of multi-item measures. A common objection 
against the use of single items is that such measures may contain large error components 
due to measurement error that leads to biased results and a loss of reliability. This has 
compelled scholars to recommend the use of indexes instead, combining related single items 
to largely cancel out measurement error. There are three main reasons why I do not resort 
to multi-item measures. First, as my substantial interest is in studying processes of opinion 
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change, lumping opinion items into indexes removes the focus from the object of interest. 
For the two articles studying the effects of a change of context especially, indexes risks 
blurring the effects. Second, the success of indexes in canceling out error depends on this 
error being random. Yet, as will be discussed later, there are indications that the biases in 
the data have elements of structure. In those instances, lumping single items together may 
exacerbate rather than minimize the problem of measurement error. Third, as the number 
of items within each policy field varies, some indexes would be based on a minimum amount 
of information. By choosing to focus on single items, just like the seminal studies of Converse 
(1964) and Zaller (1992), I am prone to finding opinion instability, either because of ‘errors in 
the items’ or ‘errors in the people’, to borrow Freeder et al.’s (2019) apt wording. 
 
By using specific public policy statements as opinion items, I base my dissertation on what 
Sears and Levy (2003) label the ‘nonattitudinal side’ of the dimension of affective strength, 
spanning nonattitudes to ‘symbolic predispositions.’ Thus, by weight of the item choice, I am 
biased toward identifying high levels of volatile opinions in the public (e.g., Zaller, 1992). If 
this postulation holds true, I should perform an easy empirical test on the expectation of 
high levels of opinion change. Another concern is related to the ability to properly tap public 
sentiment when using specific policy items. Berinsky (2017: 320) holds that more specific 
items demand greater expertise on the part of the respondent, and thus they fail to 
accurately gauge mass opinions. I recognize this concern, yet in this dissertation I am 
preoccupied with a broad assessment of opinion change, focusing on an extensive number 
of policy issues that vary in their levels of specificity. And despite this concern about the 
choice of measurement being prone to report opinion instability, both with the use of single 
items and with the choice of directional statements, this dissertation finds support for 
consistently moderate opinion change.  
 
 How representative is Norway? 
The three empirical articles in this dissertation are all based on panel data that are 
exclusively from Norway, yet they make use of and aspire to inform broader theories of 
opinion change and its mechanisms. There is an obvious tension between the intent to 
provide general insights and the limited empirical scope of the data utilized to achieve this 
task. Thus, in this section, I spend some time discussing both the possibilities and the 
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limitations to generalize to other contexts given that the empirical material used in the 
thesis is based on Norway. 
 
Following the comparative studies of Campbell and Valen (1961), Niemi and Westholm 
(1984), and Granberg and Holmberg (1988), the multi-party system is the systemic 
characteristic substantiated to explain the relatively more stable attitude formation found in 
Norway and Sweden when compared to the US. If this holds true, Norway should be a ‘least 
likely case’ through which to study opinion change. As already discussed, Norway’s political 
system is characterized by stability and endurance. Besides having a stable multi-party 
system, Norway’s overall economic situation has been very solid the last decades. Moreover, 
Norway did not suffer the same consequences of the 2008 economic crisis that hit Europe 
hard, and the anti-systemic ‘threat from the right’ has been less pronounced in Norway than 
it has been in many other European countries. Although it is a populist right-wing party, 
Norway’s Progress Party is considered moderate. Due to low thresholds of representation, 
the Progress Party has long been represented in parliament, and since 2013, it holds the 
position of junior party in a Conservative-led coalition government. Relating this to the 
notion of Norway being a ‘least likely case’ of opinion change, one would expect that 
Norway’s stable steering in terms of an enduring multi-party system, a prosperous economy, 
and successful co-optation of anti-systemic parties into the political system minimizes the 
chances of observing widespread political opinion change. Yet, if we do detect considerable 
opinion change in Norway, the implications should be more severe for less stable and less 
democratically efficient countries.  
 
That said, Norway also experiences a host of contemporary trends that are common to most 
European countries. The development of increased immigration, followed by the dramatic 
increase in asylum claims during the 2015 refugee crisis, has made the policy field of 
immigration more contentious than ever, mirroring the developments in Europe in general. 
Likewise, reports of increasing inequality and a concentration of wealth among the very few 
is a general trend in the Western world, and in Norway it challenges support for the 
Norwegian welfare state and its workings (e.g., Aaberge et al., 2016). Moreover, despite the 
relatively seamless integration of the Progress Party into the Norwegian political system, the 
presence of dissatisfied democrats — meaning citizens reporting discontent with and 
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distrust in the performance of the political system — is found in Norway as well as in most 
other European countries (Linde and Dahlberg, 2016; Haugsgjerd, 2018). Thus, despite its 
stable political system, changes to the guiding principles in Norwegian society follow the 
trends seen in the rest of Western Europe. Put differently, Norway is challenged by the same 
social, economic, and political trends that are currently shaping European politics, and if 
these developments lead to changing patterns of opinion formation the results for 
Norwegian citizens are likely to be representative of a broader group of countries. Therefore, 
I argue that the findings of this dissertation are relevant for and possibly representative of 
other European multi-party countries.  
 
Consequently, this comprehensive study of opinion change in Norway should be relevant for 
the theories that this thesis makes use of and aspires to inform. However, as the literature is 
still US dominated, both in terms of the amount of research produced and in its outreach, it 
is clear that this dissertation with data from a single country does not allow for bold 
generalizations based on a least likely approach. Nonetheless, the studies add to the 
cumulative knowledge of opinion volatility among voters within multi-party states, thereby 
contributing to the European tradition of public opinion research.  
 
4.4 Challenges of inference: Panel attrition and panel conditioning bias 
There are two important methodological issues associated with the use of panel surveys: panel 
attrition and panel conditioning. In this section, I introduce the two challenges concerning inferences 
related to the data used for this dissertation, run analyses aimed at evaluating the presence of both 
phenomena in the data that I use, and discuss the implications of the results. The analyses indicate 
that while systematic panel attrition is likely an issue in the data, panel conditioning effects are 
considered a minor problem. 
 
 The problem with panel attrition 
Although it offers unique benefits for observational studies, survey panel data is sensitive to 
attrition. Panel attrition20 is the rate of dropout of respondents from one wave to 
subsequent waves. Studies of attrition in survey panel data have identified both 
demographic predictors and survey experience variables to predict which respondents will 
                                                          
20 A different designation used in the literature is ‘survey non-response.’ 
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drop out over time (Olson and Witt, 2011; Frankel and Hillygus, 2014). Panel attrition is a 
potential problem because it disturbs the sampling design, reduces effective sample sizes, 
and, if correlated with the outcomes of interest, can bias substantive results (Frankel and 
Hillygus, 2014: 336). If attrition is both systematic and extensive, the conclusions that we 
arrive at may be fraught with error.  
 
The NCP data used for this dissertation cover three recruitment rounds: wave 1 (November 
2013), wave 3 (October 2014), and wave 8 (March 2017). In the two first recruitment waves, 
25, 000 Norwegian residents that were randomly drawn from the National Population 
Registry were invited to respond, whereas in wave 8 22, 000 people made up the gross 
sample. The panel recruitment rate,21 counting all respondents who offered their e-mail 
addresses and agreed to be re-contacted as panel members out of the pool of respondents 
who were invited to join the survey, was 20.1% in wave 1, 23.1% in wave 3 and 19,7% in 
wave 822 (Skjervheim and Høgestøl, 2013; Skjervheim and Høgestøl, 2014). This number is 
high compared to the international literature on panel recruitment success, which report 
recruitment rates from 8,6% to 14,5% depending on the number and mode of recruitment 
stages (Rao et al., 2010). 
 
The issue of attrition is most relevant for the NCP where nine survey waves are used in 
different combinations. Thus, I calculate panel attrition rates for the wave-1 and wave-3 
samples in the NCP.23 First, I calculate the cumulative non-response rate treating the 
respondents of wave 1 as the total sample (100%). Second, I calculate the attrition rate for 
both a balanced and an unbalanced sample, since I use both types of samples in my articles.  
 
Table 1, based on wave-1 recruits, and Table 2, based on wave-3 recruits, show the presence 
of panel non-response across waves. The left side of the tables includes the rate of 
                                                          
21 The following formula was used to calculate the recruitment rates: 
 (1&3) =
 
  −  ( > 95 +   +  ) 
 
22 Out of the 24 942 individuals who received invitation letters for NCP prior to wave 1, 4870 survey panel 
respondents were identified. In wave 3, 24 928 invitation letters were sent out, with 5613 citizens agreeing to 
be panel members. And in wave 8, 21, 521 received the invitation latter with 4245 respondents registering as 
panel members. 
23 I do not include the wave 8 panel members in this section as this group of respondents is only included of 
two of the waves used in this dissertation (wave 8 and wave 10).  
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respondents who have completed all survey waves since they were recruited, constituting a 
balanced panel. The right side of the tables displays the number of recruited panel members 
who have answered at least one of the consecutive waves, constituting an unbalanced 
panel. The numbers displayed are for the entire sample of wave-1 and wave-3 panel recruits. 
However, the number of respondents exposed to different survey questions varies. As such, 
all three articles discuss patterns of attrition in their Supporting Information (SI) sections.  
 











Wave 1  4870 100 % 4870 100 % 
Wave 2 3344 69 % 3357 69 % 
Wave 3 2578 53 % 2927 60 % 
Wave 4 2149 44 % 2687 56 % 
Wave 5 1801 37 % 2460 51 % 
Wave 6 1752 36 % 2208 45 % 
Wave 7 1651 34 % 2183 45 % 
Note: The data on panel attrition are based only on the panel members recruited in wave 1. The respondent 
retention data from the data provider does not allow for distinguishing between sample loss due to the 
ineligibility or attrition of eligible cases. Thus, we cannot separate between respondents dropping out and 
respondents dying or falling ill. 
 
 











Wave 3  5613 100 % 5613 100 % 
Wave 4 3534 63 % 3610 64 % 
Wave 5 2549 45 % 2991 53 % 
Wave 6 2084 37 % 2651 47 % 
Wave 7 1820 32 % 2490 44 % 
Wave 8 1331 24 % 2377 42 % 
Wave 10 1216 22 % 2302 41 % 
Note: The data on panel attrition are based only on the panel members recruited in wave 3. The respondent 
retention data from the data provider does not allow for distinguishing between sample loss due to the 
ineligibility or attrition of eligible cases. Thus, we cannot separate between respondents dropping out and 
respondents dying or falling ill. 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 indicate that there is a considerable amount of non-response across 
waves in the NCP, as expected. We see that there is higher dropout rates among the panel 
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members recruited in wave 324. The similarity in the patterns across the two tables confirms 
that recruitment time does not affect attrition. Rather, it is the time from the recruitment 
wave that guides the attrition rates. The attrition is most severe for the balanced data, with 
close to 30% of the original group of respondents answering seven consecutive waves. For 
the unbalanced panel, the attrition rate is 10—15 percentage points higher after seven 
waves. Considering the temporal pattern of attrition, it follows the tendency among panel 
surveys to level off across waves. Most respondents who attrite do so between the first and 
the second or third waves that they are asked to participate in. Consequently, those who 
stay for the first three waves are much more likely to remain in the panel longer. The volume 
of attriting panel members, although in accordance with the panel survey literature, speaks 
to the importance of treating the issue of representativeness carefully in the empirical 
analyses of this dissertation.  
 
Moving on to the second data source of this dissertation, the NNES, the mode of surveying is 
personal interviews, either through home visits or telephone interviews. Due to its mode of 
conduct as well as being a short panel of only two waves, the NNES is less prone to attrition 
bias compared to web-based panels like the NCP (Dillman et al., 2009). The gross sample is 
randomly drawn from the register of voters, securing a representative panel for the 
population above 18 years. For the two-wave panel data included from the NNES, the 
recruitment rate is 55% (from a gross sample of 3140 individuals and a net sample of 1726 
respondents), while the panel attrition rate between wave 1 and wave 2 is 45%, excluding 
non-eligible respondents (Statistics Norway, 2015: 6). Taking the space between waves into 
account, the panel attrition seems to be bigger for the NCP than for the NNES; although, as 
mentioned, some of this is likely to be related to the survey mode and panel fatigue. 
 
Moving on to the predictors of attrition based on the waves studied here, the NCP panel 
shows a systematic underrepresentation of respondents with elementary education or less 
(population = 25.2 %, net sample = 9.3 %) and respondents with upper secondary education 
(population = 41.2 %, net sample = 29.9 %), independent of gender and age. This is paired 
with a systematic overrepresentation of respondents with degrees from universities and 
                                                          
24 This is a specific tendency of this recruitment group that has not been replicated in other recruitment 
rounds, and for which we have not found proper explanations (Skjervheim and Høgestøl, 2016b). 
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university colleges (population = 33.6 %, net sample = 60.8 %). Moreover, the 
underrepresentation is strong for young men (population = 10.4 %, net sample = 3.9 %) and 
for respondents from the three northernmost counties (population = 9.3 %, net sample = 7.7 
%) (Skjervheim et al., 2017).25 This lack of representativeness is taken into account by using 
probability weights based on age, gender, education and geography in all the analyses of this 
dissertation (Skjervheim and Høgestøl, 2013). And although using probability weights is 
clearly inferior to actually observing a representative group of respondents, it is markedly 
better than doing nothing. 
 
In the three articles, I have dealt with the presence of attrition by either 1) conducting a 
complete case analysis on the subset of respondents who completed all panel waves 
relevant to each empirical article and assuming that non-response is missing completely at 
random (MCAR), meaning that it is not related to any observed or unobserved data, or (2) 
running analyses on the unbalanced panel data and assuming that the patterns of attrition 
are missing at random (MAR), meaning that the probability of non-response is only related 
to observed data (Singer and Willett, 2003: 156-159). Unfortunately, the assumptions of 
MCAR and MAR are hard to meet. Most often, these assumptions are usually unfounded in 
survey panel data (Frankel and Hillygus, 2014). Despite this, most of the panel analyses 
within the field treat the panel data as randomly missing due to the complexity of statistical 
techniques to account for non-random attrition (Wawro, 2002).  This is also the approach 
used in this thesis. Still, in all the articles I am transparent about the systematic aspects of 
attrition and discuss their possible impact on the models. Moreover, all the conclusions 
drawn from the three studies are based on both balanced and unbalanced panel models, to 
substantiate that the patterns of randomness in the data do not bias the empirical findings. 
 
 The problem of panel conditioning  
The question of panel conditioning26 is one of learning effects. That is, whether participation 
in one wave of a survey has an effect on respondents’ answers to the questions in 
subsequent waves. If this happens in a systematic manner, the concern is that this kind of 
                                                          
25 The reports of under- and overrepresentation across different strata are based on wave 10 of November 
2017, the last panel wave included in this dissertation. 
26 Another designation is ‘time in sample bias’. 
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measurement error will be confounded with real attitude change. Panel conditioning is not a 
new topic within survey research. Already in 1940, Lazarsfeld (1940: 128) noted that: “the 
big problem yet unsolved is whether repeated interviews are likely, in themselves, to 
influence a respondent’s opinions.” The literature identifies three mechanisms that may 
provoke panel conditioning. The first argument is that as a respondent is repeatedly 
subjected to the same question, their answers become more stable over time. A second 
argument is that over time, the motivation to answer the same question drops, leading to 
satisficing behavior. Third, survey panelists become specialists over time, leading them to 
give more accurate responses as they become familiar with the survey questions. 
 
Empirically, studies tend to find panel conditioning effects on knowledge and behavioral 
questions but remain less consistent in their conclusions on panel conditioning effects on 
social and political opinions (Cantor, 2008; Binswanger et al., 2013; Halpern-Manners et al., 
2014; Struminskaya, 2016). The modest strand of research focusing on the effects on 
opinions are inconclusive as to whether this is a problem in panel analyses or not. Panel 
surveys differ by design, and the data sources used in this project are characterized by being 
low-intensity surveys with (relatively) long time intervals between each wave. Moreover, the 
data is collected through web surveys, meaning there is no direct interaction between an 
interviewer and an interview object. Several assumptions about panel conditioning are 
based on the effect of being interviewed repeatedly by the same person (Kreuter et al., 
2008). Thus, both of these features should decrease the concerns surrounding panel 
conditioning 
 
One problem with studies of panel conditioning is that the conventional approaches are ill-
suited to distinguish the effects of panel conditioning from the effects of panel attrition. 
Moreover, those that try to separate the two effects — typically through post stratification 
weights — have to make strong assumptions about the randomness of attrition, which we 
know is problematic in most panel survey data (e.g., Das et al., 2011; Warren and Halpern-
Manners, 2012). 
 
Related to the data used in this dissertation, there is reason to believe that they are less 
affected by panel conditioning than other kinds of panel data. First, as already mentioned, 
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data on attitudes seem to be less marked by panel conditioning than for instance knowledge 
questions (Binswanger et al., 2013; Toepoel et al., 2009). Second, previous studies have 
shown that the low-intensity modes of the survey panels used here, six months between 
waves for the NCP and four years for the NNES, make them less susceptible to conditioning 
bias (Halpern-Manners et al., 2014).  
 
To empirically investigate panel conditioning in my data, I take advantage of an approach 
introduced by Halpern-Manners et al. (2017) that allows us to draw sound conclusions about 
the presence of panel conditioning without the possible contamination of panel attrition. 
This is done by selecting respondents with the same underlying propensity to persist in the 
sample. Here I focus only on the NCP items as they fulfill the criteria of enough waves and a 
refreshment sample necessary to properly test for panel conditioning.27 I take advantage of 
two groups of respondents, those who were recruited to the NCP from wave 1 (cohort A) 
and those who were recruited to the first refreshment sample of wave 3 (cohort B). By 
systematically selecting individuals from both cohorts who participated in the first three 
survey waves after they were recruited and then comparing both cohorts’ responses at wave 
3 I can identify the effects of panel conditioning in that survey wave. With this structure, 
both cohorts experienced the same social and economic context at the time of their survey 
responses, and both exhibited the same propensity to persist in the NCP panel (because 
both groups participated in the same number of waves).28 Put differently, both cohorts have 
been equated on both observable and unobserved characteristics. Thus, if the responses 
vary systematically across recruitment cohorts, we can ascribe these differences to panel 
conditioning (Halpern-Manners et al., 2017: 108-109).  
 
As the items in the NCP are asked to subsamples, the number of respondents who fulfill the 
criteria of answering the first three waves after recruitment vary from 1445 to 3449. 
Between 928 and 947 respondents entered the sample in the first wave (cohort A), while 
                                                          
27 Preferably, an analysis of panel conditioning effects should also be run on the NNES data, but as two-wave 
data cannot separate panel conditioning effects from panel attrition effects such studies are not possible for 
this data source. 
28 Three of the items included in this analysis were first asked in wave 2 of the NCP. For these three variables, 
cohort 1 consists of respondents who answered the item in both wave 2 and wave 3, and cohort 2 consists of 
all respondents recruited in w3 who answered the items in wave 3 and wave 4. 
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between 517 and 2514 respondents entered the sample in the third wave (cohort B). Since 
the NCP employs a split-ballot design, three of the survey items were not consistently asked 
to the same subgroup of panelists. Moreover, one of the items was not asked in wave 2, 
making it impossible to create two cohorts based on the criteria above. Hence, we have 
excluded these variables from the analyses. Of the 13 policy items from the NCP used in this 
dissertation, panel conditioning is checked for the remaining nine variables. To analyze panel 
conditioning effects, I carry out hypothesis tests comparing the response patterns in wave 3 
across cohorts, considering the seven-point Likert scales as continuous and using t-tests to 
compare group means.29 The results are reported in Table 3. 
 








  t p 
Norway should reduce its consumption level to address climate change 947 525 0.045 0.964 
We should stop extracting oil and gas in the Lofoten (LoVeSe) area 943 2506 0.312 0.755 
Technological innovations will resolve climate change 936 522 -0.481 0.631 
Norway will lose its identity if more Muslims come to live here 928 517 -0.101 0.920 
Begging should be prohibited in Norway 928 516 1.179 0.239 
Refugees and Norwegians should have equal social security rights 933 2490 2.870 0.004 
Public activities would be better and cheaper if operated by the private sector 929 2514 -0.148 0.883 
Private schools should be permitted 932 2498 -0.593 0.553 
Tax rates should be lowered even if it results in cutbacks on welfare 930 2511 0.112 0.911 
 
The results comply with most of the panel conditioning studies on attitudinal questions, 
finding that this is not a big problem. Out of the nine panel items included in the analysis, 
only one item indicates a panel conditioning effect, with the t-test being significant at a .01 
level (marked in bold font in Table 3). This applies to the attitudinal item on equal social 
service rights for refugees and Norwegians, independent of their citizenship status. The 
difference displayed in Table 3 indicates that members of the wave-1 cohort were 3% (or 0.2 
points on a 1—7 scale) less likely to support equal social security rights for refugees and 
Norwegians. The effect size is small compared to past research on panel conditioning effects 
(for an extensive review, see Cantor, 2008). Based on this account, I conclude that there 
exist no systematic differences between the two panel cohorts.  
                                                          
29 Due to Likert scales being treated both as continuous and categorical in the literature, we also ran chi-square 
tests for categorical measures. The results are practically the same, although they identify panel conditioning to 
be present in the Tax-item as well. Thus, in the chi-square tests, two out of nine items indicate panel 
conditioning effects. 
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It is a drawback that I am not able to check for panel conditioning in the data source with the 
most policy items used in this dissertation, the NNES. Still, the analyses run on the NCP, 
combined with the conventional conclusion of analyses of panel conditioning on attitude 
data, reveal a lack of effect, which strengthens my confidence in the data being unaffected 
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5 The structure of the thesis 
The articles comprising this dissertation examine the scope of opinion change and its 
determinants in light of the theoretical and methodological foundations discussed in the 
previous sections of this introductory chapter. The first article takes a broad approach, 
analyzing the magnitude of opinion change among Norwegian citizens on a broad range of 
40 different policy issues across two different panel datasets with varying time between 
waves. The two following articles are case studies of single-policy issues, allowing me to 
delve into the mechanisms of opinion change. Common to both articles is that I follow the 
public’s opinions on specific policies before, during, and after these policy areas go through 
real-world changes. The second article investigates mechanisms of opinion change by 
studying a controversial policy proposal to make street begging illegal as it was introduced, 
discussed, and decided upon within the parliamentary system. Last, the third article studies 
the scope and determinants of attitude change during an exogenous shock — that of the 
refugee crisis and a sudden influx of refugees. Taken together, the three articles make up a 
thorough assessment of the presence of citizen opinion change and its determinants within 
the context of a Norwegian multi-party system. 
 
In this section, I present the three articles in more detail, placing a particular focus on 
accounting for each article’s connection to the overall research question of the thesis, laying 
out each article’s empirical groundwork, and drawing lines to the theoretical framework 
upon which this thesis is based with the intention of further theory development. In the 
following, I briefly present the articles’ contributions to the foundations of opinion change 
within a multi-party context. Table 4 presents an overview of the three articles and the 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































- 59 - 
 
5.1 Article 1: Opinion Instability in Representative Democracies: Making a Case for 
the Politically Consistent Citizen 
 
Article 1 is a comprehensive study of the extent to which citizens consistently hold stable 
attitudes. The article takes Converse’s (1964; 1970) nonattitude thesis, which states that 
“large portions of an electorate do not have meaningful beliefs” (Converse, 1964: 245), as its 
theoretical point of departure. This article speaks directly to the US literature dominating the 
field, concluding that citizens largely fail to defend the ideal of a democratic citizen that is 
set out in normative democratic theory (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Campbell et al., 1960; 
Converse, 1964; Converse, 1970; Freeder et al., 2019; Hill and Kriesi, 2001). According to this 
body of literature, there are only two groups of citizens who fulfill the ideal of a democratic 
citizen: 1) the politically sophisticated; and 2) those who mobilize on the issue. Yet Converse 
(1964) determines that these groups of citizens make up a small segment of the population. 
Despite this being a mantra for behavioral research, the empirical base for this claim is 
narrow and yet has been subject to little critical scrutiny. Yet as behavioral theories have 
been applied to multi-party systems in more recent years, these assumptions have been 
questioned (Granberg and Holmberg, 1988; Granberg and Holmberg, 1996; Niemi and 
Westholm, 1984; Togeby, 2004). Thus, the first article is devoted to study patterns of 
opinion change within a new context: the Norwegian. Specifically, the following two 
research questions are pursued: 1) to what extent do citizens vary in their political attitudes 
across time? and 2) is the level of opinion instability moderated by political predispositions 
like political awareness and issue importance? 
 
I assess the level of opinion change using individual-level data across 40 unique policy issues 
comprising an exhaustive range of political issues that are important to the Norwegian 
political elite and the general public. The policy areas covered are public—private, welfare, 
center—periphery, immigration, environmental issues, Christian—secular, and global—
national. Data are collected in the period 2009—2016 through the NCP and the NNES. 
Different setups of the two panel studies allow me to study and compare long-term (four-
year intervals) and short-term (six-month intervals) opinion changes. 
 
Modelling change through a measure of absolute opinion change, we find small effects of 
time on policy opinion change across both data sources, indicating that the level of opinion 
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change among Norwegian citizens is modest. Analyses of the conditional effects of political 
sophistication and issue importance on opinion instability indicate smaller and more 
inconsistent effects compared to much of the dominant literature. In terms of political 
sophistication level only 9/40 models found statistically different patterns of change, yet 
they were all in the expected direction, with the more knowledgeable citizens having less 
volatile policy opinions than the less knowledgeable citizens. Turning to the conditional 
effect of issue importance, only 11/40 models were statistically significant, and all models 
except one confirm the hypothesized expectation that the more important a citizen finds the 
policy issue at hand, the more stable the citizen’s opinion.  
 
The article demonstrates that citizens generally hold stable attitudes to the extent that it can 
be argued that citizens are politically consistent and tend to hold real attitudes that are 
neither naïve nor innocent of ideology. Moreover, the study finds that this opinion stability is 
not mainly driven by the politically sophisticated and the strongly opinionated, as much of 
the previous literature has argued. Rather, having a stable opinion is a trait of the general 
public. These conclusions stand in direct opposition to the elite-driven approaches to this 
topic. Second, the article offers suggestive evidence that when considerable shifts in 
opinions do happen, contextual factors may help explain the volatility. In one deviant case of 
considerable opinion change identified in this data material, we find that the movement is 
ascribed to the 2015 refugee crisis, which led to a collective shift in opinions in a more 
restrictive direction in the period after the crisis.  
 
As discussed in the theoretical section, in an ideal representative democracy, citizens hold 
their politicians accountable for their policies through elections, and as such, politicians’ 
main task is to implement the public will through policy-making. The findings in this article 
suggest that, as opposed to Converse’s dire conclusion, the general public in Norway holds 
real attitudes by which the politicians rule. In addition, this article also finds that context is 
likely to influence the propensity for citizens to change their opinions. Yet to gain a more 
thorough understanding of which factors influence citizens’ political attitudes, a more 
detailed analysis of specific policy issues and their broader contexts is needed.  
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5.2 Article 2: Do Voters Follow? The Effect of Party Cues on Opinion Change During a 
Policy Process 
 
Article 2 examines the relationship between party cues, issue salience and opinion change 
related to the controversial policy proposal to criminalize street begging.  The main 
expectation investigated in this study is that party cues should affect people’s support for 
policy. I study this party cue theory through an in-depth examination focusing on a policy 
proposal to ban street begging from its introduction to its parliamentary treatment. 
 
Studies of party cue effects assume that partisans will follow cues from their preferred party 
and reject cues from other parties because of an affective bond to the party (e.g., Bartels, 
2002; Campbell et al., 1960; Zaller, 1992), due to parties serving as information shortcuts 
(e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Sniderman, 2000), due to motivated reasoning (e.g., Bullock, 2011; 
Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010; Taber and Lodge, 2006), or due to learning effects (e.g., Lenz, 
2009; Broockman and Butler, 2017). Coupled with issue salience theory the expectation is 
that party cues are more efficiently communicated to the population as a policy issue 
becomes salient (Togeby, 2004; Zaller, 1992). Empirically, this should be observed as a 
polarization of opinions as citizens become aware of their party’s standpoint on an issue. In a 
more sober account of party cue effects, the literature on party manifestos argues that 
voters fail to notice policy changes, at least in the short run (e.g., Adams et al., 2011; Adams 
et al., 2012). If this is the case, we should find no effect of one party’s policy change among 
its voters. 
 
To test for the influence of party cues on opinion change, I study a proposal to criminalize 
street begging that was initiated by the Norwegian Conservative-led government in 2014. I 
ask the following research question: to which extent do party cues succeed in explaining 
patterns of opinion movement among voters? I test two features of party cues: first, I study 
whether party cue effects increase with the salience of the issue. Second, as the Center Party 
changes their policy position during the process, I test whether an actual party policy shift 
makes voters update their attitudes to ensure alignment with their party.  
 
The case of street begging has some characteristics that requires attention. The issue 
attracted little attention before it was introduced after the general elections of 2013, when a 
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rightist minority coalition government consisting of the Conservative Party and the Progress 
Party gained power. Yet within one year, two proposals to ban street begging — first a 
voluntary municipal ban and then a national ban — were announced, discussed, and decided 
upon. Both proposals had majority support in parliament with help from the agrarian Center 
Party. In this one-year period, the policy issue became highly salient in the public debate. 
And while the first proposal for a voluntary municipal ban received majority support in 
parliament and was implemented in the summer of 2014, the proposal for a national ban on 
street begging failed to be heard in February 2015 after the Center Party withdrew its 
support following weeks of massive public debate concerning a proposed expansion of the 
ban to also criminalize the facilitation of street begging. Consequently, the proposition to 
ban street begging never reached parliament and was withdrawn by the Ministry of Justice 
and Public Security. 
 
Taking advantage of four-wave panel data monitoring respondents’ support for street 
begging before, during, and after the policy reform is presented, I can study the effect of 
party cues as the reform is discussed and decided upon in a real-world setting. I run growth 
models directly estimating the effect of party cues and a change in issue salience on policy 
support through interaction effects. Thus, both the empirical and methodological 
specificities of this analysis arguably makes me well-situated to expand our knowledge on 
the effects of party cues and salience on opinion change.  
 
The descriptive analysis finds large opinion shifts in the general public across supporters of 
parties both favoring and opposing the proposal. Going against the expected party cue effect 
is the finding that the two voter groups move in parallel, both becoming substantively less 
supportive of a ban on begging over time. The growth models further confirms that parties 
face some constraints in successfully swaying the public with their endorsements. First, I find 
that party cues only play a role for the opponent parties’ supporters and this effect 
materializes only as the policy issue becomes salient in the public debate. Second, the study 
indicates that actual policy shifts, studied through the Center Party turnabout, successfully 
instruct voters to update their policy position accordingly. Yet blurring this finding is the 
observation that supporters of all political stripes become less supportive of a ban in this 
period. Related to this non-finding, I suggest that there are different processes affecting the 
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two groups causing them to move in the same direction. For the Center Party supporters, I 
argue that the highly salient shift in policy support explains their movement, which is 
consistent with the party cue assumption. For the rest of the electorate, I argue that the 
public debate following the publication of the national ban proposal, focusing on the 
punishment of benevolent Norwegians as well as the human rights aspects related to 
criminalizing people in need, leads citizens to ignore party cues. 
 
The findings suggest that party cues are not an omnipotent regulator of opinion change. 
Rather, their influence seems to depend on the policy issue being salient, along with the 
party’s role in the policy process. Moreover, I find suggestive evidence that citizens may 
disregard party cues if the information environment disfavors the position held by their 
preferred party. Connected to the theoretical debate about the democratic citizen, this 
study supports the idea that citizens are affected by their party’s policy endorsements but 
that the effect is modest and affected by whether this is a salient issue for both the party 
and the public debate. Thus, I find limited support for the idea that citizens are easily 
manipulated by elite cues. Instead, I argue that voters seem to evaluate the party cues 
against the broader information environment and their own predispositions, shown 
empirically through the differential effects found across voter groups.  
 
5.3 Article 3: The Scope Effects of the Refugee Crisis on Public Opinion Toward 
Immigration 
Like Article 2, Article 3 (co-authored with Elisabeth Ivarsflaten) is also an in-depth study of 
one political event. However, unlike Article 2 this article addresses the boundary conditions 
of opinion change in a very different setting: that of systemic change due to external events. 
The article takes the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe as the empirical point of departure, 
investigating the scope of the public reaction to the crisis. In doing so, we pursue three 
research questions: 1) Did the refugee crisis lead to changing opinions not only toward 
refugees, but also toward immigrants more broadly? 2) Does the initial exclusionary reaction 
endure, and if so for how long? and 3) Was the exclusionary reaction moderated by party 
stripes or did it extend to the entire electorate?   
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The first studies based on the refugee crisis have been indecisive, with some public opinion 
researchers referring to the absence of attitudinal effects of the refugee crisis (Esaiasson et 
al., 2016; Hellevik and Hellevik, 2017), and other researchers of electoral competition mainly 
concluding that the influx of asylum seekers shifted electoral support to the right (Dustmann 
et al., 2018; Mader and Schoen, 2019; Dinas et al., 2019). 
 
Despite the inconclusive empirical field, the theoretical expectation is clear. The dominant 
group threat theory postulates that out-groups are likely to generate a sense of threat for in-
group members, leading them to express exclusionary attitudes (Albertson and Gadarian, 
2015a; Forbes, 1997). In terms of scope, we review three different literatures. In regard to 
substantive reach, one line of research argues for a limited exclusionary reaction related to 
questions only about refugees (e.g., Bansak et al., 2016; Naumann et al., 2018), while 
another strand of research predicts substantively more far-reaching reactions (Aarøe et al., 
2017; Mudde, 2007). Related to the duration of the exclusionary reaction scholars studying 
reactions of international crisis and terrorist attacks expect limited duration (Brody and 
Shapiro, 1989; Sniderman et al., 2019), while others suggest that crises like the refugee crisis 
might have transformative potential leading to permanent shifts in public opinion (Hutter 
and Kriesi, 2019). Last, connecting the move in restrictive direction to political divisions, one 
strand of literature postulates that opinion change should be limited to the far right, who 
mobilize on immigration politics (de Lange, 2007; Ivarsflaten, 2008). Yet other scholars 
theorize that given a consensual response by the political elite, as was seen in the Norwegian 
case, opinion change encompassing the broader electorate should be expected (Brody and 
Shapiro, 1989). 
The refugee crisis in Norway was concentrated in time. In terms of the number of asylum 
claims, we can identify the beginning of the crisis as occurring in August 2015 and ending in 
December of the same year. Still, in terms of refugees per capita, Norway was one of the 
highest receiving European countries (Bansak et al., 2016). The sudden influx of refugees led 
to an immediate need for housing, which in turn led to the establishment of 257 new asylum 
centers across the country during the fall of 2015 and the winter of 2016. Politically, the 
response was a broadly negotiated asylum agreement signed by six out of eight parties in 
parliament in late November 2015. The agreement marked the drawing of a stricter line in 
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the politics directed at refugees and included numerous retrenchment policies (Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security, 2015). Although the political response was quick, the sense of 
crisis as portrayed in the media lasted long after the number of asylum claims had returned 
to normal. 
To investigate the effect that the refugee crisis had on the Norwegian public’s attitudes 
toward the same group, we utilize seven-wave panel data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel, 
ranging from November 2014 to November 2017. This allows us to measure people’s 
opinions on two policy issues related to asylum seekers and immigrants before, during, and 
after the refugee crisis — one aimed directly at refugees and their right to social services and 
the other aimed at support for immigration to Norway in general. 
The descriptive analysis confirms a clear movement in the opinion toward more restrictive 
attitudes, both toward refugees in particular (-7.3%) as well as toward immigrants in general 
(-12,8%). The panel models identify that the population remains negative toward refugee 
rights and immigrants over a considerable amount of time and long after the authorities 
have taken the necessary measures to gain control of the situation. Still, between 16 months 
and two years after the situation is placed under control, the opinion reverts to the pre-crisis 
level, indicating that no permanent shift in opinion is seen. Last, panel analyses of the 
conditional effect of party support for opinion change find that the movement in restrictive 
direction was unidimensional. Supporters of the two parties opposing the asylum agreement 
move just as much as supporters of the asylum deal parties both in terms of the refugee 
social rights item and the general immigration item.  
This study confirms the expected exclusionary reaction to external shocks by using unique 
panel data securing baseline data prior to the crisis. Yet the most notable contribution of this 
article is theoretical and concerns the question of the scope of the exclusionary reaction. It 
finds that the restrictive reaction comprised both asylum-seeker and immigrant policies, it 
was visible among voters of all political stripes, and it endured long (but not forever) after 
the situation had been brought under control. We argue that the latter finding, identifying a 
perturbation effect, is the most consequential finding as it suggests that citizens might 
change their attitudes temporary in meeting with a sudden change in context, but that there 
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exists a baseline attitude that people fall back at after a period of time, indicating that 
citizens’ attitudes are grounded in broader beliefs. 
This study shows how an external shock can (temporarily) reorient public opinion. In such 
exceptional times, we find indications that all voters seem to notice the sudden influx of 
refugees and interpret events in the same direction, which is reflected in a united shift in a 
restrictive direction. Yet we also see a politicization of the immigration field, as seen in the 
broadly supported asylum agreement ratified in the midst of crisis, introducing more 
restrictions of asylum seekers’ rights and benefits. Although we cannot separate the effects 
of the actual influx from what happens at the political stage, the pattern of opinion 
movement aligns with the context and citizens’ information environment. Importantly, the 
fact that the restrictive attitudes stick for almost two years before they revert back to pre-
crisis levels indicates that this change in opinions was real and not random. Had the public 
been characterized by nonattitudes (the Converse argument), there should have been no 
pattern at all, and if attitudes are ad hoc cognitive assessments of survey questions (the 
Zaller argument), one would expect opinions to return to baseline as soon as the media 
pressure declines. Thus, the durability of restrictive attitudes indicates that people hold 
consistent attitudes, supporting the main argument in this thesis regarding democratically 
capable citizens. 
Connected to the broader theoretical framework of this dissertation, this study highlights 
that there are instances where considerable shifts in opinion do occur. Yet this should not 
automatically be cited to support the argument that ordinary people lack the capacity to 
know what they want and need. Quite the opposite, the finding of a perturbation effect 
should be interpreted in support of the idea that when context changes, people revisit and 
temporarily update their attitudes yet fall back on their baseline attitude after some time, 
which is in line with the classical understanding of citizens in democratic theory as informed 
and responsive in a meaningful (rather than a random) way.  
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6 Conclusion and future research 
‘To speak with precision about public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with 
the Holy Ghost’ (Key, 1961: 8). 
 
As Key rightly points at, making predictions about public opinion is a demanding endeavor. 
This study has aspired to the field by focusing on a small, yet vital part of the immense field 
of public opinion research: opinion instability. The field of opinion change is characterized by 
absence of a common understanding of the most vital questions. As has been pointed out 
repeatedly in this chapter, there exists no agreement on whether the diagnose of the 
democratic citizen is a good one or a bad one. Aggregate level studies argues that 
democracy is doing well as long as the electorate moves in stable and meaningful ways in 
relation to politics, independent of individual-level volatility behind the aggregate stability 
(Erikson et al., 2002; Page and Shapiro, 1992). Adding leverage to this conviction is the 
argument that it is the aggregate opinion as presented through polls that informs the public 
debate and receives politicians’ attention, thus shaping public policy. Nonetheless, if the 
theoretical point of departure is democratic theory, as is the case for this thesis, the 
presence of considerable proportions of citizens characterized by random fluctuations 
implies that democracy is empty at its core. This insight provided the motivation for this 
dissertation, researching patterns of public opinion change and their determinants. 
 
6.1 The consistent median citizen 
What kind of citizen has this dissertation revealed? My empirical articles have sketched the 
outline of a median citizen who most of the time holds stable opinions on a range of political 
matters as different as oil and gas drilling in Northern-Norway, private schools, international 
agreements, and social service rights for refugees. This citizen’s opinions are somewhat 
more stable on political issues with which she is preoccupied, and her median level of 
political sophistication seems to make her a bit less volatile, although these findings are on 
the margins. Moreover, she may change her attitudes into accordance with her preferred 
political party and party representatives. Still, this is by no means an automated reaction, 
and it seems to coincide with the party’s focus on the policy issue under scrutiny as well as 
whether our citizen is already mobilized on the issue of interest. Moreover, when sudden 
dramatic political events occur, our median citizen is aware of and responsive to such crises 
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as they play out in real life. The new information communicated through intensive media 
coverage and a consensual elite makes her revisit her standpoints and pushes her to 
increase her support for protective policies, even if her initial reaction would be to reject 
government politics. Yet this shift in opinion is temporary and eventually reverts to a 
baseline position, although this reversal is slow-moving and lasts long after the crisis is 
declared to be over by the authorities.  
 
Our median citizen’s opinions are relatively stable, but not to the point of being rigid. She 
responds in predictable ways when she changes her opinions, based on predispositions, 
party endorsements and changes to her local environment and her ‘imagined community’ of 
Norwegians. As such, our median citizen seems neither characterized by non-attitudes nor 
ideological naïveté. Rather, she is a consistent citizen who maneuvers her political 
convictions in response to the politics of the day. Importantly, she embodies the 
characteristics of a citizen capable of fulfilling her most important task according to 
democratic theory, which is that of holding the political elite accountable for their policies 
through the ballot box. 
 
The elitist theory of democracy ascribes a minimal role to citizens in democracy due to their 
lack of clear and consistent policy preferences and low levels of political knowledge. This 
dissertation has provided apt evidence that the former assertion holds no universal bearing. 
This does not mean that we have found support for the classical theory of democracy. For 
that, this dissertation is too narrow in scope. Yet the overall low levels of opinion change and 
the structured movement of opinions due to external events do challenge a central part of 
the empirical groundwork for the elitist theory of democracy. 
 
6.2 Theoretical implications 
Taken together, and based on thorough analyses of the Norwegian public, the main 
implication of the studies presented in this dissertation is that there is little evidence to 
suggest that citizens lack the ability to participate intelligently in politics, at least when the 
volatility of opinions is considered. This conclusion counters the dominant American line of 
thought in which citizens are commonly viewed as politically inconsistent and thus easily 
manipulated. In Sniderman’s (2017: 1) elevated words:  
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There is a large literature of democratic lament. The most familiar of the 
lamentations is that the public is woefully uninformed about politics and public 
affairs. The verse that follows, as all students of public opinion know, is that ordinary 
citizens fall short of the coherence of thought that a democratic politics requires. 
 
The findings of this dissertation contrast with this presumption of an elite-driven democratic 
theory that the average citizen demonstrates inadequate understanding of public policy and 
unstable policy judgments, challenging their ability to execute democratic citizenship 
(Converse, 1964; Converse, 1970; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Freeder et al., 2019; Kinder, 
2006; Achen and Bartels, 2016). Instead, this thesis argues that the overall level of opinion 
change is low, and the patterns of conditioning indicate that the usual suspects in the 
literature — political sophistication, issue importance and party cues — are less influential 
than postulated by the dominant theory.   
 
To answer the research questions set out in this project, I have studied policy attitudes, 
which in the survey literature is assumed to be on the weaker side of a continuum from 
strongly held to weakly held attitudes, and thus prone to report opinion instability. In this 
regard, the findings of high levels of stability that this thesis demonstrates is reassuring. If 
we can expect stable opinions across a range of specific policy issues then we should expect 
stable opinions on other more ideologically oriented or value-based issues as well.  Adding 
strength to this argument, Sniderman and Bullock (2004) contend that stability and 
constraint are ‘causally parasitic’ on congruence. More specifically, they hold that policy 
positions that are stable over time and constrained across issues tend to be congruent with 
citizens’ basic political orientations (Sniderman and Bullock, 2004: 337). This further 
strengthens the proposition that the median citizen is characterized by consistency. 
 
Still, an important issue remains unsettled. Are the findings of mostly stable citizens and 
small differences across political sophistication, importance, and partisanship enough to 
conclude that public opinion is enlightened? Arguably not. In the panoramic study of belief 
systems, Converse (1964) conducted studies on both opinion stability and opinion 
constraint. And although I find indications of high degrees of constraint along different issue 
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dimensions, I do not study constraint systematically. More important, the structures that 
opinions are organized into in this thesis may be something other than the standard 
ideological orientation that many public opinion scholars assume. Even though people’s 
opinions are real and organized in systematic and knowable ways, they may, in Kinder’s 
(2002: 40) words, be “democratically disheartening”. Studies of attitudes toward immigrants 
and immigrant policies both in the US and Europe find racism and ethnocentrism to be the 
principal determinants of opinion (Gilens, 1999; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Kessler and 
Freeman, 2005). If such forces are at play across issue fields, real opinions do not guarantee 
enlightened politics. 
 
Another main take-away from this dissertation is that scholars should loosen the tight link 
established in the literature between opinion change and nonattitudes. Where Converse 
(1964) identified a negligible group of durable changers in his ‘black and white’ model, this 
dissertation found the third group of non-random changers to be a more powerful force 
than what has previously been acknowledged. The patterns of opinion change found in all 
three articles indicate that this volatility can be informed and meaningful, rather than naïve 
and random. Taken together, this dissertation serves to support a more positive picture of 
public opinion as consisting of politically consistent citizens with the ability to hold the 
political elite accountable for their policies. 
 
Another point substantiated by the empirical studies of this dissertation is the diversification 
of opinion instability across policy issues. There is a tendency in the literature to talk about 
citizens as either politically stable or unstable on a general basis, yet recent studies highlight 
the role of core issues in organizing people’s political interest and attention. Based on the 
three studies, it seems we should reorient this general description of opinion change to 
focus on citizens’ stability and instability across different policy domains. For example, we 
would expect an issue related to income inequality to invite more stable opinions than a 
technical environmental policy issue because of the former issue’s close connection to the 
traditional left—right cleavage and the continued focus of this matter in the political debate. 
This argument aligns with the pluralist account of democratic decision-making, contending 
that: “The public is a complex blending of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ segments, or ‘engaged’ 
citizens and mere ‘spectators’. The size and representative composition of these segments, 
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which surely changes across issues and over time, indexes in many ways the health of a 
democracy” (Price, 2008: 21). 
 
Moreover, this thesis should be read as a plea to be less sanguine about the generalizability 
of individual-level political capabilities across political contexts. Pushing this point to the 
extreme, a generation of research on European public opinion has been misled by taking 
generalized conclusions on citizens’ lacking competencies based on (mainly one data source 
on) US citizens only as the starting point. To be clear, this should not be read as passing a 
verdict on US citizens’ capabilities, but rather as a request to take systemic differences more 
seriously into account. In the early days of public opinion research, American polling data 
were amongst the only survey data there were, and so we can be sympathetic to the general 
outlook of the conclusions drawn from them. However, a lack of a peripheral vision seems to 
characterize much of the American literature on public opinion dynamics today as well. A 
recent example is found in Achen and Bartels (2016: 13):  
 
Our empirical facts are drawn predominantly from the democratic system we know 
best, that of the United States. However, we refer frequently to other democratic 
systems as well, and we believe that our findings are likely to be of considerable 
relevance even in countries that differ from the United States – and from each other 
– in many important historical, institutional, and cultural respects. While history, 
institutions and culture surely shape specific democratic practices in important ways, 
they do not, as best we can tell, lead to fundamentally different conclusions about 
the central issues we raise (…). 
 
Based on the findings of this dissertation, I respectfully disagree with Achen and Bartels 
outlook. The insights gained through working with this dissertation has convinced me that to 
fully understand the capabilities of a citizenry, one must be sensitive to the system that 
surrounds and shapes the conditions for opinion formation. Based on the three studies 
making up this dissertation, I attribute parts of the reason for the patterns of stable attitudes 
in Norway to the multi-party system and the media system that shape and provide content 
for political competition and public debate. Moreover, a universal educational system has 
created a well-educated public which is assumed to make citizens better equipped both to 
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evaluate competing information and make autonomous decisions. That said, as this study is 
not a comparative study across countries, I can provide only suggestive evidence for these 
connections. To further our understanding of boundary conditions of opinion change, the 
time is ripe for more comparative efforts to be made, especially between multi-party 
systems, facilitated by the steadily increasing number of high-quality panels across European 
countries.  
 
Some questions are not possible to answer precisely through the studies conducted here. An 
important question that this dissertation fails to provide a definite answer to is the extent to 
which the patterns of opinion volatility found in Norway can be attributed to the multi-party 
system. I argue in this chapter that in multi-party systems, parties are guided by core issues 
that they focus on, and that this creates a lucid political environment for citizens despite the 
many parties and the multidimensional nature of party competition. If this is the systemic 
characteristic shaping low levels of opinion change then the findings in this study arguably 
extend to other European multi-party systems as well. Yet until we have a convincing group 
of studies on opinion change finding similar patterns across multi-party systems in Europe, 
we cannot rule out other and more particular factors playing a role here. For instance, it may 
be the generally high level of education in the Norwegian population that allows for less 
volatile attitudes by enabling citizens to think about policy matters in an organized manner. 
And it may be the media system, by securing equal and free access of political information 
through public broadcasters, that facilitates comparatively high knowledge of day-to-day 
politics among the public despite many citizens not being particularly politically interested. 
Thus, an important future contribution would be to systematically pin down the systemic 
mechanisms facilitating low public opinion volatility through comparative studies. That said, 
the similarity of systemic aspects across the Scandinavian countries and the overlap of 
findings from this study with similar studies conducted in Sweden (Granberg and Holmberg, 
1996) and Denmark (Togeby, 2004) bolsters my confidence that the findings apply to the 
Scandinavian publics as a whole, and possibly also generalize to the broader group of 
European multi-party systems. 
 
Finally, situating the studies within a real-world setting, the dissertation demonstrates that 
the policy-specific context and the broader information environment provide important 
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insights into the dynamics of opinion change. This observation is not an original finding in 
the public opinion literature. However, I believe that these findings have important 
implications for the comparative study of opinion change. As we develop theories and 
models aimed at understanding general factors underlying public opinion, it is important to 
make clear the conditions under which we expect citizens to behave in the manner that we 
assume. 
 
6.3 The way ahead 
Given that several studies, including this dissertation, assign a significant role to the political 
system, an important next step is to look closer at what exactly it is about the multi-party 
system that biases it toward politically consistent citizens. Specifically, does it only apply to 
consensual multi-party systems, or is it rather related to the multidimensional cleavage 
structure of multi-party systems, which sorts attitudes in a systematic way across the 
different policy dimensions? Or maybe it is all about a symbiosis between the party system 
and the media system shaping the information environment? Alternatively, is the answer to 
be found in the universal education system that mediates opinion instability? Such studies 
would considerably deepen our understanding of the macro mechanisms shaping the 
political learning environment, and this should arguably pave the way for much-needed 
theory development within the field of European public opinion studies.  
 
A second avenue for future research is to study more thoroughly how the information 
society affects opinion change, for example, to better understand when it trumps party cues 
and when it does not. In situations where the party cue and the information environment go 
in the same direction, it is hard to disentangle the effects. Yet by using situations in which 
these considerations are conflicting, we might develop illuminating insights into the push 
and pull mechanisms for opinion change during periods of uncertainty. Although this has 
been done experimentally (e.g., Boudreau and MacKenzie, 2014; Boudreau and MacKenzie, 
2018; Bullock, 2011), observational data have some superior features to understand how 
situations of conflicting information affect citizens’ opinions in a complex world. Such an 
approach would no doubt extend beyond the limitations of this study. 
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Moreover, this dissertation studies the volatility of opinions across an exhaustive set of 
policy issues. This is an improvement on previous studies that focus on a few selected issues 
that are typically high on the public agenda. Yet this study does not systematically categorize 
and compare opinion change effects across levels of issue saliency. Thus, a question for 
future research is to what extent opinion changes on policy issues are mitigated by the 
likelihood that citizens are preoccupied with the political issue in advance. 
 
Finally, future studies should make an effort to use a broader range of policy opinion 
measures. As the debate surrounding opinion change has been so focused on measurement 
error and the wording of questions, it is surprising that there has not been a stronger focus 
on how policy items are phrased. Indeed, a finding in the survey research is that ranking data 
are more reliable than the corresponding rating data (Visser et al., 2000: 238-239). With the 
recent shift of survey mode from telephone to web-based interviewing, the prior 
administrative and resource-based objections to the use of rankings no longer have merit. 
Thus, varying the policy opinion measure should expand the findings of this study that 




- 75 - 
 
7 Literature list 
Aaberge, R., Atkinson, A. B., & Modalsli, J. (2016). On the mesaurement of long-run income 
inequality: Empirical evidence from Norway, 1875-2013. Retrieved from: 
https://www.ssb.no/en/forskning/discussion-papers/on-the-measurement-of-long-
run-income-inequality-empirical-evidence-from-norway-1875-2013 
Aalberg, T., & Curran, J. (2012). How media inform democracy: A comparative approach (Vol. 
1): Routledge. 
Aalberg, T., Van Aelst, P., & Curran, J. (2010). Media systems and the political information 
environment: A cross-national comparison. The International Journal of 
Press/Politics, 15(3), 255-271.  
Aardal, B. (1999). Velgere i 1990-årene. Oslo, Norway: NKS-forlaget. 
Aardal, B., & Bergh, J. (2015). Valg og velgere : en studie av stortingsvalget 2013. Oslo: 
Cappelen Damm akademisk. 
Aarøe, L., Petersen, M. B., & Arceneaux, K. (2017). The behavioral immune system shapes 
political intuitions: Why and how individual differences in disgust sensitivity underlie 
opposition to immigration. American Political Science Review, 111(2), 277-294.  
Achen, C. H. (1975). Mass political attitudes and the survey response. American Political 
Science Review, 69(04), 1218-1231.  
Achen, C. H., & Bartels, L. M. (2016). Democracy for realists: Why elections do not produce 
responsive government: Princeton University Press. 
Achen, C. H., & Bartels, L. M. (2018). Statistics as If Politics Mattered: A Reply to Fowler and 
Hall. The Journal of Politics, 80(4), 1438-1453. Retrieved from 
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/699245. doi:10.1086/699245 
Adams, J., Ezrow, L., & Somer-Topcu, Z. (2011). Is anybody listening? Evidence that voters do 
not respond to European parties’ policy statements during elections. American 
Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 370-382.  
Adams, J., Green, J., & Milazzo, C. (2012). Has the British public depolarized along with 
political elites? An American perspective on British public opinion. Comparative 
Political Studies, 45(4), 507-530.  
Albertson, B., & Gadarian, S. K. (2015a). Anxious politics: Democratic citizenship in a 
threatening world: Cambridge University Press. 
Albertson, B., & Gadarian, S. K. (2015b). The Politics of Anxiety: Anxiety's Role in Public 
Opinion. In Anxious Politics: Democratic Citizenship in a Threatening World (pp. 100-
137). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Allport, F. H. (1937). Toward a science of public opinion. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1(1), 7-23.  
Allport, G. W. (1935). Attitudes. In C. Murchison (Ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology (pp. 
798-844). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press. 
Almond, G. A. (1956). Public opinion and national security policy. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
20(2), 371-378.  
Andreß, H.-J., Golsch, K., & Schmidt, A. W. (2013). Applied panel data analysis for economic 
and social surveys: Springer Science & Business Media. 
Ansolabehere, S., Rodden, J., & Snyder, J. M. (2008). The strength of issues: Using multiple 
measures to gauge preference stability, ideological constraint, and issue voting. 
American Political Science Review, 102(2), 215-232.  
Bansak, K., Hainmueller, J., & Hangartner, D. (2016). How economic, humanitarian, and 
religious concerns shape European attitudes toward asylum seekers. Science, 
354(6309), 217-222.  
 
- 76 - 
 
Bartels, L. M. (2002). Beyond the running tally: Partisan bias in political perceptions. Political 
Behavior, 24(2), 117-150. Retrieved from <Go to ISI>://WOS:000179389500003. 
doi:10.1023/a:1021226224601 
Bassili, J. N. (1996). Meta-judgmental versus operative indexes of psychological attributes: 
The case of measures of attitude strength. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 71(4), 637.  
Bell, A., & Jones, K. (2015). Explaining fixed effects: Random effects modeling of time-series 
cross-sectional and panel data. Political Science Research and Methods, 3(1), 133-
153.  
Bennett, W. L., & Iyengar, S. (2008). A new era of minimal effects? The changing foundations 
of political communication. Journal of Communication, 58(4), 707-731.  
Berelson, B. (1952). Democratic theory and public opinion. Public Opinion Quarterly, 313-
330.  
Berglund, F. (2004). Partiidentifikasjon og politisk endring : en studie av langsiktige 
partitilknytninger blant norske velgere 1965-1997. Oslo: Unipax Institutt for 
samfunnsforskning. 
Berinsky, A. J. (2017). Measuring public opinion with surveys. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 20, 309-329.  
Binswanger, J., Schunk, D., & Toepoel, V. (2013). Panel conditioning in difficult attitudinal 
questions. Public Opinion Quarterly, 77(3), 783-797.  
Blumer, H. (1948). Public opinion and public opinion polling. American Sociological Review, 
13(5), 542-549.  
Bolsen, T., & Leeper, T. J. (2013). Self-interest and attention to news among issue publics. 
Political Communication, 30(3), 329-348.  
Boudreau, C., & MacKenzie, S. (2014). Informing the electorate? How party cues and policy 
information affect public opinion about initiatives. American Journal of Political 
Science, 58(1), 48-62.  
Boudreau, C., & MacKenzie, S. A. (2018). Wanting what is fair: How party cues and 
information about income inequality affect public support for taxes. The Journal of 
Politics, 80(2), 367-381.  
Bourdieu, P. (1979). Public Opinion does not Exist. In A. Mattelart & S. Siegelaub (Eds.), 
Communication and Class Struggle (pp. 124-130). New York: Macmillan. 
Brody, R. A., & Shapiro, C. R. (1989). A reconsideration of the rally phenomenon in public 
opinion. In S. Long (Ed.), Political Behavior Annual (Vol. 2). Denver: Westview Press. 
Broockman, D. E., & Butler, D. M. (2017). The Causal Effects of Elite Position-Taking on Voter 
Attitudes: Field Experiments with Elite Communication. American Journal of Political 
Science, 61(1), 208-221.  
Bullock, J. G. (2011). Elite influence on public opinion in an informed electorate. American 
Political Science Review, 105(03), 496-515.  
Burns, N. (2006). The Michigan, then National, then American National Election Studies. 
Retrieved from Amerian National Election Studies:  
Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). The American Voter. New 
York: John WIley & Sons. 
Campbell, A., & Valen, H. (1961). Party identification in Norway and the United States. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 25(4), 505-525.  
Cantor, D. (2008). A review and summary of studies on panel conditioning. Handbook of 
longitudinal research: Design, measurement, and analysis, 123-138.  
 
- 77 - 
 
Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source 
versus message cues in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
39(5), 752.  
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing public opinion in competitive democracies. 
American Political Science Review, 101(04), 637-655.  
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2010). Dynamic Public Opinion: Communication Effects over 
Time. American Political Science Review, 104(4), 663-680. 
doi:10.1017/S0003055410000493 
Clawson, R. A., & Oxley, Z. M. (2008). Public opinion : democratic ideals, democratic practice. 
Washington, D.C: CQ Press. 
Converse, P. E. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), 
Ideology and Discontent (pp. 206-261). New York: Free Press. 
Converse, P. E. (1970). Attitudes and non-attitudes: Continuation of a dialogue. In E. R. Tufte 
(Ed.), The quantitative analysis of social problems (pp. 189). Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley. 
Converse, P. E. (1987). Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process. The 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 51, S12-S24. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2749185.  
Converse, P. E., & Markus, G. B. (1979). Plus ca change…: The new CPS election study panel. 
American Political Science Review, 73(1), 32-49.  
Dahl, R. A. (1956). A preface to democratic theory (Vol. 115): University of Chicago Press. 
Das, M., Toepoel, V., & van Soest, A. (2011). Nonparametric Tests of Panel Conditioning and 
Attrition Bias in Panel Surveys. Sociological Methods and Research, 40(1), 32-56. 
doi:10.1177/0049124110390765 
de Lange, S. L. (2007). A new winning formula? The programmatic appeal of the radical right. 
Party Politics, 13(4), 411-435.  
Delli Carpini, M. X., & Keeter, S. (1996). What Americans know about politics and why it 
matters: Yale University Press. 
Dillman, D. A., Phelps, G., Tortora, R., Swift, K., Kohrell, J., Berck, J., & Messer, B. L. (2009). 
Response rate and measurement differences in mixed-mode surveys using mail, 
telephone, interactive voice response (IVR) and the Internet. Social Science Research, 
38(1), 1-18. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0049089X08000306. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2008.03.007 
Dinas, E., Matakos, K., Xefteris, D., & Hangartner, D. (2019). Waking Up the Golden Dawn: 
Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Increase Support for Extreme-Right Parties? 




Druckman, J. N. (2012). The politics of motivation. Critical Review, 24(2), 199-216.  
Druckman, J. N., Fein, J., & Leeper, T. J. (2012). A source of bias in public opinion stability. 
American Political Science Review, 106(2), 430-454.  
Druckman, J. N., & Leeper, T. J. (2012). Is Public Opinion Stable? Resolving the Micro/Macro 
Disconnect in Studies of Public Opinion. Daedalus, 141(4), 50-68. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41721980.  
 
- 78 - 
 
Dustmann, C., Vasiljeva, K., & Piil Damm, A. (2018). Refugee Migration and Electoral 
Outcomes. The Review of Economic Studies, rdy047-rdy047. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy047. doi:10.1093/restud/rdy047 
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
College Publishers. 
Enders, C. K. (2010). Applied missing data analysis: Guilford Press. 
Erikson, R. S. (1979). The SRC panel data and mass political attitudes. British Journal of 
Political Science, 9(1), 89-114.  
Erikson, R. S., MacKuen, M. B., & Stimson, J. A. (2002). The Macro Polity: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Esaiasson, P., Martinson, J., & Sohlberg, J. (2016). Flyktningkrisen och medborgarnas 
förtroende för samhällets institutioner - en forskarrapport. Retrieved from 
Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap:  
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: John Wiley & Sons. 
Feldman, S. (1989). Measuring Issue Preferences: The Problem of Response Instability. 
Political Analysis, 1, 25-60. doi:10.1093/pan/1.1.25 
Feldman, S., Huddy, L., & Marcus, G. E. (2015). Going to War in Iraq: When Citizens and the 
Press Matter: University of Chicago Press. 
Finkel, S. E. (1995). Causal Analysis with Panel Data: Sage. 
Finseraas, H., & Listhaug, O. (2013). It can happen here: the impact of the Mumbai terror 
attacks on public opinion in Western Europe. Public Choice, 156(1-2), 213-228.  
Forbes, H. D. (1997). Ethnic conflict: Commerce, culture, and the contact hypothesis: Yale 
University Press. 
Fowler, A., & Hall, A. B. (2018). Do Shark Attacks Influence Presidential Elections? 
Reassessing a Prominent Finding on Voter Competence. The Journal of Politics, 80(4), 
1423-1437. Retrieved from 
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/699244. doi:10.1086/699244 
Frankel, L. L., & Hillygus, D. S. (2014). Looking beyond demographics: Panel attrition in the 
ANES and GSS. Political Analysis, 22(3), 336-353.  
Freeder, S., Lenz, G. S., & Turney, S. (2019). The Importance of Knowing “What Goes with 
What”: Reinterpreting the Evidence on Policy Attitude Stability. The Journal of 
Politics, 81(1), 274-290.  
Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking politics. Cambridge: Cambridge university press. 
Gilens, M. (1999). Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty 
Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gilens, M. (2001). Political ignorance and collective policy preferences. American Political 
Science Review, 95(2), 379-396.  
Graham, J. W. (2009). Missing data analysis: Making it work in the real world. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 60, 549-576.  
Granberg, D., & Holmberg, S. (1988). The political system matters: Social psychology and 
voting behavior in Sweden and the United States: Cambridge University Press. 
Granberg, D., & Holmberg, S. (1996). Attitude constraint and stability among elite and mass 
in Sweden. European Journal of Political Research, 29(1), 59-72.  
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems : three models of media and 
politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Halpern-Manners, A., Warren, J. R., & Torche, F. (2014). Panel conditioning in a longitudinal 
study of illicit behaviors. Public Opinion Quarterly, 78(3), 565-590.  
 
- 79 - 
 
Halpern-Manners, A., Warren, J. R., & Torche, F. (2017). Panel Conditioning in the General 
Social Survey. Sociological Methods & Research, 46(1), 103-124. 
doi:10.1177/0049124114532445 
Hamilton, A., Madison, J., & Jay, J. (1961). The Federalist Papers. New York: Penguin. 
Hansen, T. (2016). Det kollektive grunnlaget for individuell velstand : en innføring i offentlig 
politikk og økonomi. Oslo: Cappelen Damm akademisk. 
Haugsgjerd, A. H. (2018). A vicious circle? Performance Dissatisfaction, Political Distruct and 
the Populist Response. (PhD), University of Oslo, Oslo.  
Heidar, K., & Rasch, B. E. (2017). Political Representation and Parliamentarism. In O. Knutsen 
(Ed.), The Nordic Models in Political Science. Challenged, but Still Viable? (pp. 105-
123). Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
Held, D. (1987). Models of democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hellevik, O., & Hellevik, T. (2017). Utviklingen i synet på innvandrere og innvandring i Norge. 
Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, 58(03), 250-283. Retrieved from 
http://www.idunn.no/tfs/2017/03/utviklingen_i_synet_paa_innvandrere_og_innvan
dring_i_norge.  
Herbst, S. (1993). Numbered Voices: how opinion polling has shaped American politics. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hetherington, M. J., & Rudolph, T. J. (2015). Why Washington won't work: Polarization, 
political trust, and the governing crisis: University of Chicago Press. 
Hill, J. L., & Kriesi, H. (2001). An extension and test of Converse’s “black-and-white” model of 
response stability. American Political Science Review, 95(2), 397-413.  
Holbrook, A. L. (2011). Attitude Change Experiments in Political Science. In J. N. Druckman, 
D. P. Green, J. H. Kuklinski, & A. Lupia (Eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Experimental 
Political Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Holdal, E., Søbstad, T., & Wormdal, B. (2019). Historisk oppslutning for Senterpartiet i nord. 
NRK.  
Hutter, S., & Kriesi, H. (2019). European Party Politics in Times of Crisis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining 
grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases. Comparative Political 
Studies, 41(1), 3-23.  
Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (1987). News that matters: Television and American opinion: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Jacks, J. Z., & Devine, P. G. (2000). Attitude importance, forewarning of message content, 
and resistance to persuasion. Journal of Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 22(1), 
19-29.  
Jenkins-Smith, H. C., & Herron, K. G. (2005). United States Public Response to Terrorism: 
Fault Lines or Bedrock? Review of Policy Research, 22(5), 599-623.  
Key, V. O. (1961). Public opinion and American democracy.  
Kinder, D. R. (2002). Belief Systems after Converse. In M. B. MacKuen & G. Rabinowitz (Eds.), 
Electoral Democracy (pp. 13-47). Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. 
Kinder, D. R. (2006). Belief systems today. Critical Review, 18(1-3), 197-216.  
Kinder, D. R. (2007). Curmudgeonly advice. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 155-162.  
Kinder, D. R., & Sanders, L. M. (1996). Divided by color: Racial politics and democratic ideals. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
- 80 - 
 
Knutsen, O. (2017a). Political Parties and Party Systems. In O. Knutsen (Ed.), The Nordic 
Models in Political Science. Challenged, but Still Viable? (pp. 45-75). Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget. 
Knutsen, O. (2017b). Social Cleavages and Political Value Conflicts. In O. Knutsen (Ed.), The 
Nordic Models in Political Science. Challenged, but Still Viable? (pp. 77-104). Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget. 
Kreuter, F., Presser, S., & Tourangeau, R. (2008). Social desirability bias in cati, ivr, and web 
surveysthe effects of mode and question sensitivity. Public Opinion Quarterly, 72(5), 
847-865.  
Krosnick, J. A. (1988). Attitude importance and attitude change. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 24, 240-255. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(88)90038-8 
Krosnick, J. A. (1989). Attitude Importance and Attitude Accessibility. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 15, 297-308. doi:10.1177/0146167289153002 
Krosnick, J. A. (1990). Government policy and citizen passion: A study of issue publics in 
contemporary America. Political Behavior, 12(1), 59-92.  
Krosnick, J. A., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2005). The Measurement of Attitudes. In D. 
Albarracin, J. B. T., & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The Handbook of Attitudes (pp. 21-76). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Kumlin, S. (2001). Ideology–Driven opinion formation in Europe: The case of attitudes 
towards the third sector in Sweden. European Journal of Political Research, 39(4), 
487-518.  
Lawrence, R. G., & Bennett, W. L. (2001). Rethinking media politics and public opinion: 
Reactions to the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal. Political Science Quarterly, 116(3), 425-
446.  
Lazarsfeld, P. F. (1940). " Panel" Studies. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 4(1), 122-128.  
Lecheler, S., de Vreese, C., & Slothuus, R. (2009). Issue importance as a moderator of framing 
effects. Communication research, 36(3), 400-425.  
Leeper, T. J., & Robison, J. (2018). More Important, but for What Exactly? The Insignificant 
Role of Subjective Issue Importance in Vote Decisions. Political Behavior, 1-21.  
Leeper, T. J., & Slothuus, R. (2016). If only citizens had a cue: The process of opinion 
formation over time. Working Paper, London School of Economics /Aarhus University, 
London/Aarhus.  
Lenz, G. S. (2009). Learning and opinion change, not priming: Reconsidering the priming 
hypothesis. American Journal of Political Science, 53(4), 821-837.  
Lenz, G. S. (2012). Follow the leader? : how voters respond to politicians' policies and 
performance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lijphart, A. (2012). Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six 
countries: Yale University Press. 
Linde, J., & Dahlberg, S. (2016). Democratic discontent in times of crisis? In Y. Peters & M. 
Tatham (Eds.), Democratic Transformations in Europe. Challenges and opportunities. 
London: Routledge. 
Lippmann, W. (1925). The Phantom Public. New York: Harcourt Brace. 
Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national 
perspectives. New York: Free press. 
Lodge, M., & Taber, C. S. (2013). The rationalizing voter: Cambridge University Press. 
Luskin, R. C. (1987). Measuring political sophistication. American Journal of Political Science, 
31(4), 856-899.  
 
- 81 - 
 
Mader, M., & Schoen, H. (2019). The European refugee crisis, party competition, and voters’ 
responses in Germany AU. West European Politics, 42(1), 67-90. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1490484.  
Maier-Rabler, U. (2008). ePolicies in Europe: A human-centric and culturally biased 
approach. In P. Ludes (Ed.), Convergence and Fragmentation: Media Technology and 
the Information Society (pp. 47-66). Bristol: Intellect. 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security. (2015). Tiltak for å møte flyktningkrisen. 
Regjeringen.no: Ministry of Justice and Public Security Retrieved from 
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumentarkiv/regjeringen-solberg/andre-
dokumenter/jd/2016/avtale-om-tiltak-for-a-mote-flyktningkrisen/id2462434/ 
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge: University Press 
Cambridge. 
Mueller, J. E. (1973). War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. Wiley: New York. 
Narud, H. M., & Valen, H. (2001). Issue Ownership in a Multidimensional Policy Space: Voters 
Evaluation of Party Performance. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the APSA 
in San Francisco, San Francisco. 
Naumann, E., Stoetzer, L. F., & Pietrantuono, G. (2018). Attitudes towards highly skilled and 
low-skilled immigration in Europe: A survey experiment in 15 European countries. 
European Journal of Political Research, 57(4), 1009-1030.  
Nie, N. H., Verba, S., & Petrocik, J. R. (1979 [1976]). The changing American voter. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Niemi, R. G., & Westholm, A. (1984). Issues, parties and attitudinal stability: A comparative 
study of Sweden and the United States. Electoral Studies, 3(1), 65-83.  
Noelle-Neumann, E. (1993). The spiral of silence : public opinion, our social skin (2nd ed.). 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
OECD (2015). In it together. Why less inequality benefits all. Retrieved from Paris: 
https://www.oecd.org/social/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all-
9789264235120-en.htm 
Olson, K., & Witt, L. (2011). Are we keeping the people who used to stay? Changes in 
correlates of panel survey attrition over time. Social Science Research, 40(4), 1037-
1050. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0049089X11000354. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.03.001 
Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1992). The rational public: Fifty years of trends in Americans' 
policy preferences: University of Chicago Press. 
Petrocik, J. R. (1996). Issue ownership in presidential elections, with a 1980 case study. 
American Journal of Political Science, 825-850.  
Plescia, C., & Staniek, M. (2017). In the eye of the beholder: voters’ perceptions of party 
policy shifts. West European Politics, 40(6), 1288-1309.  
Price, V. (2008). The Public and Public Opinion in Political Theories. In W. Donsbach & M. W. 
Traugott (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Public Opinion Research (pp. 11-24). London: 
SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Prislin, R. (1996). Attitude stability and attitude strength: One is enough to make it stable. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 26(3), 447-477.  
Rao, K., Kaminska, O., & McCutcheon, A. L. (2010). Recruiting probability samples for a multi-
mode research panel with internet and mail components. Public Opinion Quarterly, 
74(1), 68-84.  
 
- 82 - 
 
Saris, W. E., & Sniderman, P. M. (2004). Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, 
Measurement Error, and Change: Princeton University Press. 
Schuman, H., & Presser, S. (1981). The attitude-action connection and the issue of gun 
control. The Annals of the American Academy of Political Social Science, 455(1), 40-
47.  
Schuman, H., & Presser, S. (1981). Questions and answers in attitude surveys: Experiments on 
question form, wording, and context. New York: Academic Press. 
Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper and 
Brothers. 
Sears, D. O., & Levy, S. (2003). Childhood and adult political development. In D. O. Sears, L. 
Huddy, & R. L. Jervis (Eds.), Handbook in Political Psychology (pp. 60-109). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Seeberg, H. B., Slothuus, R., & Stubager, R. (2017). Do voters learn? Evidence that voters 
respond accurately to changes in political parties’ policy positions. West European 
Politics, 40(2), 336-356.  
Singer, J. D., & Willett, J. B. (2003). Applied longitudinal data analysis : modeling change and 
event occurrence. 
Skjervheim, Ø., & Høgestøl, A. (2013). Norwegian Citizen Panel Methodology Report, wave 1 
(Tech.Rep.).  
Skjervheim, Ø., & Høgestøl, A. (2014). Norwegian Citizen Panel Methodology Report, wave 3 
(Tech.Rep.).  
Skjervheim, Ø., & Høgestøl, A. (2016). Norwegian Citizen Panel Methodology Report, wave 7 
(Tech.Rep.).  
Skjervheim, Ø., Høgestøl, A., & Bjørnebekk, O. (2017). Norwegian Citizen Panel Methodology 
Report, wave 10 (Tech.Rep.).  
Slothuus, R. (2010). When can political parties lead public opinion? Evidence from a natural 
experiment. Political Communication, 27(2), 158-177.  
Slothuus, R. (2016). Assessing the Influence of Political Parties on Public Opinion: The 
Challenge from Pretreatment Effects. Political Communication, 33(2), 302-327.  
Slothuus, R., & de Vreese, C. H. (2010). Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Issue 
Framing Effects. The Journal of Politics, 72(3), 630-645. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s002238161000006x. 
doi:10.1017/s002238161000006x 
Sniderman, P. M. (2000). Taking sides: A fixed choice theory of political reasoning. In A. 
Lupia, M. D. McCubbins, & S. L. Popkin (Eds.), Elements of reason (pp. 67-84). New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sniderman, P. M. (2017). The democratic faith: Essays on democratic citizenship. Yale: Yale 
University Press. 
Sniderman, P. M., Bang Petersen, M., Slothuus, R., Stubager, R., & Petrov, P. (2019). 
Reactions to Terror Attacks: A Heuristic Model. Political Psychology, 40, 245-258.  
Sniderman, P. M., & Bullock, J. G. (2004). A Consistency Theory of Public Opinion and 
Political Choice: The Hypothesis of Menu Dependence. In W. E. Saris & P. M. 
Sniderman (Eds.), Studies in Public Opinion. Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement 
Error, and Change (pp. 337-357). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Sniderman, P. M., Petersen, M. B., Slothuus, R., & Stubager, R. (2014). Paradoxes of liberal 
democracy: Islam, Western Europe, and the Danish cartoon crisis: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
- 83 - 
 
Sniderman, P. M., & Theriault, S. M. (2004). The Structure of Political Argument and the 
Logic of Issue Framing. In W. E. Saris & P. M. Sniderman (Eds.), Studies in Public 
Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error and Change (pp. 133-165). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Soroka, S., Andrew, B., Aalberg, T., Iyengar, S., Curran, J., Coen, S., . . . Tiffen, R. (2013). 
Auntie Knows Best? Public Broadcasters and Current Affairs Knowledge. British 
Journal of Political Science, 43, 719-739. doi:10.1017/S0007123412000555 
Soroka, S. N., & Wlezien, C. (2010). Degrees of democracy: Politics, public opinion, and policy: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Statistics Norway. (2015). The 2013 Election study. Documentation and table report.  
Stimson, J. A. (2004). Tides of consent: How public opinion shapes American politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Struminskaya, B. (2016). Respondent conditioning in online panel surveys: Results of two 
field experiments. Social Science Computer Review, 34(1), 95-115.  
Syvertsen, T., Enli, G., Mjøs, O. J., & Moe, H. (2014). The Media Welfare State. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. 
American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755-769.  
Toepoel, V., Das, M., & van Soest, A. (2009). Relating Question Type to Panel Conditioning: 
Comparing Trained and Fresh Respondents. Survey Research Methods, 3(2), 73-80. 
doi:10.18148/srm/2009.v3i2.874 
Togeby, L. (2004). Man har et standpunkt... Om stabilitet og forandring i befolkningens 
holdninger. Aarhus: Aarhus universitetsforlag. 
Valen, H., & Narud, H. (2007). The conditional party mandate: A model for the study of mass 
and elite opinion patterns. European Journal of Political Research, 46(3), 293-318.  
Vasilopoulos, P., Marcus, G. E., & Foucault, M. (2015). Emotional Responses to the Charlie 
Hebdo Attacks: Between Ideology and Political Judgment. Retrieved from: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693952 
Visser, P. S., Krosnick, J. A., & Lavrakas, P. J. (2000). Survey research. In Handbook of research 
methods in social and personality psychology. (pp. 223-252). New York, NY, US: 
Cambridge University Press. 
von Schoultz, Å. (2015). Nordic research on political behaviour. Scandinavian Political 
Studies, 38(4), 342-368.  
Walgrave, S., & Lefevere, J. (2013). Ideology, Salience, and Complexity: Determinants of 
Policy Issue Incongruence between Voters and Parties. Journal of Elections, Public 
Opinion & Parties, 23(4), 1-28. doi:10.1080/17457289.2013.810630 
Warren, J. R., & Halpern-Manners, A. (2012). Panel Conditioning in Longitudinal Social 
Science Surveys. Sociological Methods & Research, 41(4), 491-534. 
doi:10.1177/0049124112460374 
Wawro, G. (2002). Estimating dynamic panel data models in political science. Political 
Analysis, 10(1), 25-48.  
Weber, M. (1978 [1922]). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology (Vol. 1). 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
West Pedersen, A., & Kuhnle, S. (2017). The Nordic Welfare State Model. In O. Knutsen (Ed.), 
The Nordic Models in Political Science (pp. 219-238). Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
Zaller, J. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion: Cambridge university press. 
 
- 84 - 
 
Zaller, J., & Feldman, S. (1992). A simple theory of the survey response: Answering questions 
versus revealing preferences. American Journal of Political Science, 36(3), 579-616.  
Zuwerink, J. R., & Devine, P. G. (1996). Attitude importance and resistance to persuasion: It's 
not just the thought that counts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 
931-944. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.931 
Østerud, Ø., & Selle, P. (2006). Power and Democracy in Norway: The Transformation of 







unication Division, UiB  /  Print: Skipnes Kom
m
unikasjon AS
uib.no
ISBN: 9788230851647 (print)
9788230862674 (PDF)
